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The International Recognition of
Judgments: The Debate Between
Private and Public Law Solutions
by
Antonio F. Perez*
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered by the courts of other
sovereigns is a central tool of trade integration. Traders seek the security pro-
vided by the enforcement of legal rights and the provision of an adequate rem-
edy. Accordingly, without secure means by which that remedy may be given
effect, exporters may undervalue the gains from trade. Consequently, they may
fail to take advantage of trading opportunities that would otherwise be socially
beneficial, taking into account both the gains for individual traders and the bene-
fits that would flow to third parties. At the same time, the inability of importers
to vindicate their legal rights through the effective enforcement of judgments
would also distort incentives for trade, leading exporters not to appreciate fully
the costs of their activities and encouraging them to exploit trading opportunities
that would be better left unrealized. Self-help mechanisms may contribute to
resolving some of these problems,' but it is a basic proposition that some level
of public intervention is necessary to facilitate socially optimal trade, although
one can argue about what precise remedial rules achieve socially preferred
results.2
Domestic legal systems address the problem of achieving socially optimal
contracting through a variety of means. Public law, such as environmental pro-
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. J.D. Columbia, 1985, A.B. Harvard, 1982. A portion of this article was presented in the
Trilateral Meeting of the Canadian, U.S. and Japanese Societies of International Law, at Ottawa on
October 26, 2000. I thank the participants of that meeting for their comments and criticisms. Re-
maining errors and misjudgments are mine, of course. I thank the Columbus School of Law for its
generous support in the preparation of this paper. I also wish to thank Maura Jeffords, J.D. Class of
2001 of the Columbus School of Law, for her assistance with this paper.
1. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WrHouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DisptrrEs (1991) (analyzing the conditions under which dispute resolution operates without judicial
enforcement); Shuba Narasimban, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97
YALE L.J. 61, 95 (1987) (describing nonperformance in some contractual modifications as a kind of
self-help specific performance).
2. Compare Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,
pt. 1, 46 YALE L. J. 52 (1936) (advocating the reliance principle, rather than expectancy, as a plausi-
ble option in many cases), with Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J.
257 (1979).
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tection statutes and labor law, does the main work of addressing the negative
externality problem, although law and economic scholars argue that judge-made
law has already done much of this work in common law systems 3 and public
choice theorists argue that interest-group rent-seeking behavior in public law-
making actually distorts socially optimal common law rules.4 Yet, publicly cre-
ated remedial systems affecting private incentives for contracting do address the
cost of unrealized contracting opportunities against welfare losses flowing from
the negative externalities of contracting, albeit imperfectly. In robust democra-
cies, such as the United States, the political process ultimately addresses these
issues either through tacit acquiescence in common-law rules or through legisla-
tive or executive intervention, including both statutes creating new private rights
to judicial remedies 5 and statutes affording the government the right directly to
seek relief on behalf of public interests.6 Some argue, moreover, that "the politi-
cal system manages to overcome the inherent advantages of special interests
' 7
through "mass politics" in so-called "republican moments" 8 during which legis-
lative outcomes avoid special interest capture. What label one attaches to such
outcomes - ranging from social welfare maximization 9; a discursively justi-
fied1 ° (or morally discovered'") conception of the common good; or, less pre-
3. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4 ' ed. 1992).
4. For the seminal expositions of this position, see JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965) [hereinafter OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION]. See generally DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY,
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (critiquing so-called public choice
theory).
5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15d, which creates a private right of action and aggregate damages
for a private person injured by violation of U.S. competition laws. Roughly stated, the private right
of action here forces private monopolists to internalize the cost to society of pricing goods at values
above the marginal cost of production. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (2d
ed. 1999) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW]. Another useful example is the judicially rec-
ognized private right of action for fraud in the issuance of and transfer of stocks that is calculated to
deter such fraud, in large part because of the positive externalities that flow from maintaining the
integrity of capital markets. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 780; compare Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (holding that excluded securities dealer was entitled to limited ex-
emption from application of antitrust laws due to securities law policy of authorizing self-regulation
of securities markets).
6. The Department of Justice has exclusive criminal jurisdiction under federal antitrust law,
but has concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Trade Commission to seek civil remedies. State
attorneys general have authority to vindicate interests of consumers residing within their state by
Sherman Act suits seeking damages or equitable relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1998).
7. Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 59
(1992); reprinted in THE FOUNDATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 236 (Richard L. Revesz ed., 1997).
8. Id. at 238-39.
9. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, FACTS AND NoRMs (1996) (elaborating his conception of
"discursive justification" through ideal speech situations); Joshua Cohen, The Economic Basis of
Deliberative Democracy, SoC. PHIL. & POLICY 25, 33 (emphasizing that choices must be made in "a
deliberative way," and not "simply conform to the preferences, convictions, and ideals of citizens")
(emphasis omitted).
11. See, e.g., JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951) (locating a conception of the
common good through natural law reasoning).
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cisely but more intuitively, the judgment of the "People"'12 - may depend on
one's overall political and legal theory. It is enough to say that such decisions
by a self-governing community are practically and normatively legitimate,'
3
notwithstanding the public choice critique, even if particular applications of
some judicially or legislatively made rules reflect interest group rent-seeking
rather than satisfy some criterion of legitimacy.
At the international level, things are not quite so simple. With the emer-
gence of a global trading system, the international judgments recognition pro-
cess masks profound value conflicts. This is so because of the wide divergence
in national values on issues ranging from the propriety of the exercise of juris-
diction by national courts; the fairness of varying procedures or remedies, such
as the jury system or punitive damages; to even the location of the boundary
between trade and non-trade concerns, such as the boundary between human
rights and comparative advantage in labor costs. To the extent that domestic
political judgments about tradeoffs between competing values are embedded in
judicial judgments, political tensions are bound to emerge as these domestic
judgments seek recognition and enforcement in other states. International ten-
sions rise if foreign judgments are not recognized and domestic tensions rise if
they are recognized in defiance of national values. Ultimately, such conflicts
12. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (employing republi-
can theory to account for constitutional amendment in the U.S. outside the formal procedures pre-
scribed in Article V of the U.S. Constitution reflecting the deepest convictions of the American
people acting collectively on the basis, at least in part, of their ideals). Ackerman's conception of
constitutional politics bears some resemblance to the ideal theory advanced by John Rawls, under
which principles of justice governing the basic structure of a society can be discovered on the basis
of rational choices by individuals under conditions of moderate uncertainty as to their individual
interests, the so-called "veil of ignorance." See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
13. Staking out a rough position on how to use the concept of "legitimacy" would seem to be
necessary for developing the argument of this paper. Focusing on the descriptive component of
legitimacy, it would seem useful to draw on Max Weber's rational-legal conception of legitimacy in
this context, for rules on recognition and enforcement of judgments must be based on rule-like
commands even if the specific deviations from rules of recognition and enforcement at the municipal
level may reflect "traditionally" or "charismatically" grounded practices, such as marriage or gam-
bling laws. See generally, MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
152, 324-86 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1947) (defining "legitimacy" in terms of actual compliance and
describing as ideal types the forms of "legitimate" authority - charismatic, traditional, and rational/
legal - as resting on different forms of belief that are offered as justifications for compliance with
the commands of an authority). A useful frame of reference for discussing normative legitimacy is
contained in John Rawls' most recent work, which deals with the question of bridging belief systems
that are fundamentally incompatible if applied thoroughly yet may share sufficient common attrib-
utes to form the basis for cooperation in limited spheres of interaction. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE
LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES] (outlining a conception of polit-
ical discussion in democratic societies intended to accommodate the participation and membership in
the same political society of groups holding inconsistent "comprehensive views," that is, views of
the good, including for example those grounded in religious conceptions). It is important that Rawls
seems to suggest that a range of modes of justification - from Habermas' conception of discursive
justification to Maritain's neo-Thomist view of the common good - can form the basis for normative
justification at the level of the state. See id. at 142 nn. 28-29. Further, Rawls' recognition that even
Islam is amenable to participation in public discourse with other comprehensive conceptions sug-
gests that his basic methodology can be extended to global political ordering. See id. at 151 n. 46.
This is so even if Rawls himself thinks that his arguments are limited to a particular kind of commu-
nity not yet found universally. For a related critique of Rawls' international political philosophy, see
FERNANDO R. TESON, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 105-26 (1998).
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must be resolved through particular institutions or a mix of institutions - taking
into account that both wholly private, market-based approaches and wholly pub-
lic, political approaches will have costs. In short, international recognition of
judgments is an issue ripe for comparative institutional analysis.'
4
Institutional Alternatives
This article explores institutional alternatives for balancing the competing
trade and non-trade concerns at the national and global levels in relation to the
recognition and enforcement of judgments. It argues against a private interna-
tional law convention of the kind that is currently being negotiated at the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, and against quasi-constitutional and
constitutional solutions, such as those employed by the European Union and the
United States. Rather, the article argues that managing the tensions between
trade and non-trade values and between state autonomy and globally established
standards can best be achieved through a supplementary agreement in the World
Trade Organization (WTO).
With comparative institutional analysis must come recognition that the
question of whether to achieve efficiency or distributive justice hinges on defin-
ing the distribution of political voice and power. This requires one to consider
the underlying view of the types of political actors meriting representation in the
political community within a state. Likewise, a theory of international political
process is necessary in order to define the balance between state autonomy to
define those tradeoffs and the cosmopolitan or global perspective in assessing
the tradeoffs between efficiency and distributive justice. One might draw on the
intuitions of Hedley Bull, who thought that one can understand international
politics in terms of competing frames of reference. At one end of the spectrum
there is international anarchy, in which the only meaningful unit of social soli-
darity is the state. At the other end is cosmopolitan international society, in
which states do not play meaningful roles. Finally, in an intermediate position is
international society, in which the society of states plays a useful role in the
mediation of international conflict.1 5 In short, one can classify the costs of vari-
ous institutional alternatives in terms of whether effects on efficiency and dis-
tributive justice are determined from the standpoint of individuals forming
communities within states, the states within the community of states, or individ-
uals forming communities across states, perhaps even conceived as communities
formed within a hypothesized world state (the so-called civitas maxima).'
6
14. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, Eco-
NOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) [hereinafter KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES] (analyzing
the advantages and disadvantages of political, market and adjudicative processes as decision-making
alternatives).
15. HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS
(1977) [hereinafter BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY].
16. See generally NICHOLAS G. ONUF, THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY IN INTERNATIONALIST
THOUGHT (1998) (esp. ch. III); Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel and the
Fate of Republicanism, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1994) (attempting to recover the forgotten civic
republican foundations of international law's formative period).
2001]
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At one extreme is the traditional approach of an agreement between states,
which appears to ignore interests in global efficiency and distributive justice. At
the initiative of the U.S. Government, 1 7 and largely because of concerns that the
U.S. suffers a trade disadvantage relative to the European Community, such an
agreement is now the subject of negotiation in a series of Hague Conventions on
Private International Law (the Hague Conference). t s The Hague Conference
approach is designed, through the adoption of technical standards bridging the
differences between national legal systems, to facilitate transnational litiga-
tion.' 9 Its technical approach is reflected in the composition of the negotiating
groups, which consist primarily of professional experts, and in the important
role of the Hague Conference secretariat in performing its mandarin drafting
functions z.2  However, like other "private" legislatures in the domestic law-
making and standard-setting process,2 ' international law-making through rela-
tively nontransparent organizations that have little opportunity for broad public
participation and produce statutes for domestic implementation generate out-
comes producing either too much or too little controlling law.2 2 They might
produce too much by enabling the private interests that are disproportionately
represented in the private law-making process to achieve gains at the expense of
the public interest.2 3 They might produce too little by yielding rules that are so
17. See Peter Pfund, The Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law to
Prepare a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition/Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 7 (1998) [hereinafter Pfund, Project of the Hague Con-
ference] (special adviser to US Delegation reporting on status of the U.S. initiative). The precise
U.S. negotiating position draws largely on the work of Arther T. von Mehren, a noted U.S. and
international expert on private international law. See Arther T. von Mehren, A New Approach for
the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994) (proposing the mixed convention
approach). For views of other national representatives and interested parties, see Maryellen Ful-
lerton, Enforcing Judgments Abroad: The Global Challenge, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998) (sum-
marizing symposium contributions); Peter North, The Draft UK/US Judgments Convention: A
British Viewpoint, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 219 (1979) (noting collapse of earlier U.S-U.K. effort to
negotiate a bilateral treaty).
18. Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the Effects of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, adopted provisionally by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference,
Oct. 30, 1999, at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
19. See, e.g., Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Feb. 10, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter the
Hague Service Convention]; and Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, Oct. 7, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter the Hague Evidence
Convention].
20. See Pfund, Project of the Hague Conference, supra note 17.
21. See Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
22. See generally Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in Interna-
tional Commercial Law 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 742 (1999) [hereinafter Stephan, Futility] (extending the
model of private legislatures to international lawmaking and examining a few illustrative cases);
Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1996); REGULATORY COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: THE SEARCH FOR
VIRTUE (University of Virginia Legal Studies Working Paper Series, No. 99-12, 1999) (concluding
with the bleak assessment that the "largely unchecked power of the legal profession to construct
these rules makes it more difficult for the political process to correct poor choices of rules... ").
23. See Stephan, Futility, supra note 22, at 763-68 (discussing pro-defendant liability rules
relating to international shipping emerging from the Hague process and distinguishing it from the
results of the more pro-plaintiff Hamburg process); Malcolm Whincop, The Recognition Scene:
[Vol. 19:44
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vague and confer so much discretion to implementing agencies or judiciaries
that they either (1) replicate the status quo or (2) allow rent-seeking interest
groups yet another opportunity to achieve disproportionate gains by influencing
the exercise of discretion in the national implementation of the agreed upon
international rules. 24 International private legislatures such as the Hague Con-
ference thus raise serious legitimacy questions both at the international and do-
mestic levels.
At the other extreme is the constitutional model of recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments. One example of this constitutional model is that required of
American courts by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.25
The constitutional approach supposes the existence of a single political commu-
nity for purposes of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. It there-
fore suppresses the differences among the political sub-communities that are
embedded in the policies upon which those judgments are based. The constitu-
tional character of this approach is exemplified in the current tendency toward
deeper integration in the European Union and its apparent accompaniment by an
effort to reformulate rules concerning recognition and enforcement of judgments
as internal E.U. rules. New authority concerning judicial matters E.U. member
states have extended to the E.U. under the recent Amsterdam amendments to the
Treaty of Maastricht has made this possible. 26 The original EC treaty approach
exemplified in the Brussels Convention,27 and extended to the European Free
Trade Association countries through the Lugano Convention28 (together known
as the Brussels/Lugano regime), is in the process of mutating into an E.U. rule
commanding E.U. member states to implement the Brussels/Lugano rules as part
of their national laws. 29 Because the regulation will be binding on E.U. member
states and enforceable through the European Court of Justice, it will operate in
Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments 23 MEL. U. L. REV. 416, 436
(1999) [hereinafter Whincop, The Recognition Scene] ("recognition conventions may extend the
scope and coverage of political deals cut in domestic legislatures").
24. See Stephan, Futility, supra note 22, at 772-80 (discussing the vagueness and ambiguities
of the UN Commission on International Trade Law's (UNCITRAL) Convention on the International
Sale of Goods (CISG)); Whincop, The Recognition Scene, supra note 23, at 435-36 (drawing on
Stephan's work, suggesting the Hague Conference negotiations may produce too much discretion:
"given the [group] dynamics of expert bodies, they are likely to adopt provisions that repose discre-
tion in decision-makers, such as judges, rather than specify outcomes that flow from described cir-
cumstances (that is, standards are preferred to rules)") (citing Schwartz & Scott, The Political
Economy of Private Legislatures, supra note 21). But see Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1998) (defending these rules as laying the groundwork for
supranational interpretation based on norms emerging from the global commercial community).
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
26. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Estab-
lishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1
[hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty].
27. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter the Brussels Convention]. For the consol-
idated, current text of the convention, see 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1413.
28. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Commercial Matters,
Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L319) 9, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 [hereinafter the Lugano Convention].
29. See Council Draft Regulation 5733/00 EC of 8 February 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.
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50 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
much the same way as the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
under which the U.S. Supreme Court compels states to recognize and enforce
each other's judgments.30 For a similar effect on the global level, a treaty would
need to be self-executing, enabling all interested individuals to invoke treaty
rights to protect their substantive interests in the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. Even if such an intrusive instrument were negotiable in a
single treaty, the necessary agreement on substantive policies and the tradeoffs
among them would require a single, global political process capable of repre-
senting all individual and community interests.
This article proposes the following intermediate approach: a new multilat-
eral agreement on recognition and enforcement of judgments as part of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO is well suited to do the work of
mediating between state-centric and cosmopolitan perspectives in addressing the
problem of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. This is largely
because the remedial regime of the WTO serves the purpose of mediating be-
tween the state-centric, private law conception reflected in the Hague Confer-
ence and the constitutional, public law conception suggested by the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which subordinates state interests in
diversity to the homogenizing tendencies of a free trade policy. While WTO
dispute resolution normally results in calls upon states to conform their conduct
to the WTO's trade rules, these rulings have resulted in bargaining processes
over remedies that very often take the form of substitutional relief such as com-
pensatory tariff increases. The tension between a constitutional law approach
and a private law or bargain conception of the WTO legal order parallels the
contrast between public law's preference for compliance and private commercial
law's preference for substitutional remedies.3 t Perhaps, as Kenneth Abbott
states in reference to the GATT, the WTO's predecessor, "the role of interna-
tional institutions of justice is to apply community policy, not merely to resolve
private conflicts."'32 Yet, their role also may well be to moderate the formation
of community policy in response to political lessons learned from the resolution
of private conflicts.
The Argument for the WTO
There seems to be no doubt that the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments is an international trade issue, even though "[a]s yet, there has not been an
international focus on whether absence of private law upgrades may in some
30. On the other hand, unlike the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which
has ordinarily been interpreted not to have a public policy exception to take account of important
policy differences between political communities, the Brussels/Lugano regime does contain a public
policy exception to take account of those national differences (see infra note 97). Whether any
regulation ultimately issued by the EC would follow the Brussels/Lugano model or the U.S. Full
Faith and Credit Clause remains to be seen.
31. See Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in National Security, 23
YALE J. INT'L L. 301, 307-24 (1998) [hereinafter Perez, WTO and U.N. Law].
32. Kenneth Abbott, GAIT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18
BROOK J. INT'L L. 31, 32 (1992).
[Vol. 19:44
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cases be close to a non-tariff barrier to cross-border trade otherwise authorized
under new trade agreements."' 33 The attention the Hague Conference has re-
cently given the subject makes this clear.34 Negotiating a set of rules on the
criteria for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would, therefore,
seem to be within the competence of the WTO.
Placing the responsibility for this issue with the WTO would take advan-
tage of the binding character of WTO commitments and their enforceability
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The WTO remedial system
permits not only claims based on violations of a WTO rule yielding a prima
facie showing of nullification or impairment of negotiated trade benefits but also
so-called "non-violation" claims of nullification or impairment of benefits
through measures not in themselves violative of WTO rules. 35 Even if rules of
judgment recognition and enforcement were not made a part of the WTO law
through negotiation of a new agreement governing recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments, it might still be possible to argue that discrimination
against foreign judgments "resulting in nullification or impairment of market
access rights" would give rise to a right to a WTO remedy. This would be
contingent on trade benefits being negotiated in the next WTO negotiating round
on the premise of nondiscriminatory recognition and enforcement of judgments
protecting these trade opportunities.36
Placing the responsibility for this issue with the WTO could also take ad-
vantage of the administrative machinery of the WTO's Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM) to monitor compliance with any agreed upon WTO rules,37
providing a record of whether states have complied with their obligation not to
discriminate against foreign judgments. Such a record could facilitate dispute
resolution.
33. Hal Burman & Don Wallace, Jr., Private International Law : PIL Unification and Interna-
tional Economics: Crossroads in 2000?, 29 Irrr'L LAW NEWS 17, 18 (Section of International Law
and Practice, ABA, Winter 2000) [hereinafter Burman & Wallace, Crossroads].
34. See generally Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign Judgments as a Trade Law Issue:
The Economics of Private International Law, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 592 (Bhandari and Sykes eds., 1999) [hereinafter
Brand, Judgments as a Trade Issue].
35. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 348-49 (1995) (distinguishing prima facie cases from non-violation, nullification or im-
pairment cases and citing examples).
36. See Burman & Wallace, Crossroads, supra note 33, at 18 (focussing on the possibility that
violation of a UNCITRAL Convention on banking related issues would operate as an "impairment or
nullification" of trade benefits and on the possibility of including a Multilateral Agreement on In-
vestment in the WTO).
37. See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1154 [hereinafter TPRM]. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along
with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New GAT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477 (1994); Miquel Montana
i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Dis-
putes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 128-41 (1993); Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in
the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAW. 389, 396-406 (1995) (dis-
cussing move from power-oriented to rules-oriented approach in international trade).
20011
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Finally, a WTO-based approach could serve as a platform for a more trans-
parent, politically-accountable and rational evolution of the law's accommoda-
tion of trade and non-trade concerns at cross-issue negotiations conducted at the
global level. Meanwhile, it could preserve states' autonomy by acknowledging
national discretion to refuse to enforce foreign judgments on public policy
grounds, albeit at the price of WTO/DSB-authorized remedial countermeasures.
This approach would be consistent with the practice of the many states that
refuse to comply with WTO/DSB decisions finding certain practices illegal
under GATT, because compliance with these decisions would violate the inter-
ests of core domestic constituencies. 38 Indeed, this approach would also pre-
serve the option of defending national values through noncompliance, albeit at
the price of a loss of trade concessions. 39 The discipline of paying a price for
deviating from welfare enhancing trade rules would compel national political
processes to address the value they attach to public policies compelling them to
deviate from trade law, yielding either relaxation of the local public policy or
renewed political effort at the WTO level for re-negotiation of global rules to
accommodate the local policy. In any event, taking into account the global di-
versity of trade and related non-trade interests,40 as well as the need for domes-
tic political discretion to manage domestic political support for continuing trade
integration, 4' a WTO-based approach to the recognition and enforcement of
judgments would achieve the greatest level of trade benefits at the least political
cost.
38. The E.U.'s noncompliance with the WTO beef hormones decision seems to be a textbook
example of a case where the domestic political cost of compliance, as perceived by the E.U., would
exceed any possible retaliatory suspension of concessions the U.S. could impose. See Merry-Go-
Round, THE ECONOMIST, May 13, 2000, at 75 ("despite its professed enthusiasm for free trade, the
E.U. has shown little enthusiasm for obeying WTO rulings. Europeans stonewalled not just over
bananas, but also over rulings on hormone-treated beef.").
39. See Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More, 90
AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 416-17 (1996) (arguing "WTO rules are simply not "binding" in the traditional
sense," for "a government could renege on its negotiated commitment not to exceed a specified tariff
on an item, provided it restored the overall balance of GATT concessions through compensatory
reductions in tariffs on other items. That is, a government could change its mind about and raise a
particular tariff, provided it offset such 'nullification and impairment' of the delicate GATT balance
through compensatory tariff reductions."). But see John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J. Ir'L L. 60, 61
(1997) (taking a contrary view about the "binding" quality of GATT obligations). For a critique of
these views and argument for an intermediate position in the special case of the GATI' national
security exception, see generally Perez, WTO and U.N. Law, supra note 31.
40. See Alan 0. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International
Goods and Services Markets, 2 J. INwr'L EcoN. L. 49, 49-50 (1999) ("harmonization is inferior to a
legal system that tolerates regulatory differences subject to legal constraints," which Sykes calls
"policed decentralization").
41. See Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and International Trade Law, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Sykes, Regulatory Protection] (arguing that politically sophisticated trade
agreements preserve national discretion to invoke regulatory measures that can serve non-protection-
ist policies even if those exceptions yield some protectionism and generally avoid supranational
balancing of protectionist and non-protectionist effects as a test for legality).
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An Argument to the WTO
More important, a WTO approach would strengthen the WTO itself, ulti-
mately broadening participation in the WTO and thus increasing the legitimacy
of its work. At one point, the GATT legal community approximated the Hague
Conference in that it lacked binding force unless states enacted its rules. This
was largely because the GATT's legal status as an international organization,
and in turn the status of its dispute resolution system, was unclear from the very
beginning.4 2 This private law approach focussed on technical expertise and de-
politicized policy-making, but permitted disproportionate influence by business
interests. A public law model, by contrast, expressly politicizes lawmaking
and thereby includes a broader range of interests and examines a broader range
of policy options through political debate. The public law model thereby opens
the door to political participation in the law-creating forum rather than merely at
the municipal level, as is the case in the Hague context. An important effect of
integrating judgments into the WTO, therefore, could be to persuade those who
hold non-trade values 44 and who see the WTO as an enemy to their agendas that
non-trade interests can be vindicated through political action at the WTO.
By including the recognition of foreign judgments in the WTO trade re-
gime, state practices deviating from global standards will increasingly come
under scrutiny, which will generate information about their nature and purpose
that will enlighten both domestic and international debate. Indeed, one of the
arguments for addressing the question of judgments explicitly as a trade problem
in the WTO context is that the WTO is developing into a vehicle for measuring
compliance with trade obligations.45 Members of the WTO are now required to
allow the Trade Policy Review Body (WTO/TPRB) to review their "trade poli-
42. For contrasting views, compare JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW
AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM] (describing the anomalous legal status of the GATT as its "flawed consti-
tutional beginnings" but describing the GATT process during this period favorably), with David
Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John Jackson and the Field of Inter-
national Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 671, 714 (1995) ("An imaginary trade
constitution, liberal trade ideas, national and international political judgments, a decentralized re-
gime of bargained reciprocity: Jackson presents all these as facts rather than commitments.").
43. See LORI WALLACH AND MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?: CORPORATE
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY (1999) (Public Citizen's critique of the WTO's
record during its first five years as eroding safety, labor and environmental laws and transferring
power from domestic citizens' groups to private groups operating behind closed doors); Lori's War:
Interview with Lori Wallach, FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 2000, 118 (explaining political strategy of
Public Citizen and defending its conduct leading up to the Seattle Ministerial).
44. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658, 660 (1996) (arguing
that, "as currently envisioned, [the WTO] fails to take into account the fundamental nature of socie-
tal values, and creates little or no space in which such laws can exist. This intemperance may
diminish the already fragile support for the international trade regime, which in turn may hinder the
ability of member countries to support the World Trade Organization."); Philip Nichols, Forgotten
Linkages: Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and Analysis of the World
Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 461 (1998) (critiquing international trade law
scholarship as focussing excessively on regime theory and institutional economics, rather than his-
torical and sociological institutionalism, and thereby forgoing analysis of the impediments to effec-
tive trade law linkages to nontraditional trade law issues, such as business ethics or human rights).
45. See supra note 37.
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cies and practices. Although the WTO/TPRB's purpose is "to contribute to
improved adherence by all Members to rules, disciplines and commitments"
under the WTO, it is "not, however, intended to serve as the basis for enforce-
ment of specific obligations under the Agreements or for dispute settlement pro-
cedures, or to impose new policy commitments on Members."4 7 Nonetheless,
claims of discriminatory treatment could be presented on the basis of objective
evidence and measured against objective criteria employed by the WTO/TPRB.
Even before a case could emerge before the DSB, one might expect that asym-
metrical recognition and enforcement would emerge as an issue and that the data
measuring such compliance would begin to be developed in a way that might
prove useful later at the DSB. This is particularly the case as national govern-
ments and domestic and international interest groups begin to see a practical
purpose for the collection of such data.
Perhaps, just as foreign judgments vindicating trade-related claims would
be domestically-enforceable because of globally protected trade, thus strength-
ening individual rights to free trade, 48 judgments vindicating non-free trade in-
terests harmed by trade could also be domestically-enforceable because of the
rights enshrined in global trade law. 49 In avoiding private parties' direct access
to the WTO dispute resolution procedures and continuing to rely on domestic
adjudicatory authorities, however, this approach would avoid constitutionalizing
tendencies. 50 It would also avoid the correlative legitimacy concerns of individ-
ual standing in WTO adjudication5 ' that could arise at this preliminary stage in
the development of a global society.52 Nonetheless, enabling individuals and
groups to vindicate non-trade interests through judicial action enabled by the
46. TPRM, supra note 37, at para. C.
47. Id. at para. A.
48. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, National Constitutions and International Economic Law, in
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 3, 38-44 (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (arguing for judicial review of individual free trade claims as a check
on mercantilist behavior by states).
49. See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Non-government Parties, 17 U. PA. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 300-03 (1996).
50. Cf Lawrence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Suprana-
tional Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 287-90 (1997) (focussing on direct links, including standing
for private persons in supranational adjudicatory bodies, with sub-national entities).
51. See Michael Laidhold, Private Party Access to the WTO: Do Recent Developments in
International Trade Dispute Resolution Really Give Private Organizations a Voice in the WTO?, 12
TRANSNAT'L LAW. 427, 449 (1999) (arguing that recent examples of NGOs and others to submit
views to the DSB regarding ongoing proceedings are insufficient and that more structural change is
necessary, such as WTO/DSB appellate review of private party suits by private attorneys general
seeking WTO enforcement in national courts); Andrea K. Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Reso-
lution: Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 587
(1998) (analyzing generally the question of individual involvement in trade treaties).
52. See Philip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of Na-
tional Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1951 (1997) (reviewing Thomas
Franck's FAuNuEss IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INsTrrtTIONs (1995), and calling into question the
existence of a global community from which authoritative domestic law could directly flow without
an intervening domestic political process); Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of Interna-
tional Legisprudence, 44 HASTFNs L.J. 185, 209-10 (1993) (calling into question canons of legisla-
tive construction favoring deference to international law in an era of increasing international
lawmaking without the pedigree of domestic legitimacy).
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WTO could have significant implications for the evolution of transnational civil
society;5 3 voice, of course, diminishes the tendency for disloyalty and exit.
54
Reducing the costs of the WTO for non-trade values could thus spawn a virtuous
cycle of better political management of the tradeoffs between trade expansion
and its negative effects on non-trade interests, such as labor and the environ-
ment.55 Of course, there is a danger that the entry into an organization of those
fundamentally opposed to its purposes could in the end destroy the organization
or at least transform it into a creature that none of its creators would be able to
recognize. 56 Yet evolution of the WTO's mandate to take account of the exter-
nalities of trade liberalization does not seem to be inconsistent with its basic
mandate.
In sum, giving individual litigants affected by the negative externalities of
trade a vested interest in trade rules at the WTO would hasten the erosion of the
private law approach and instill a public law conception of international trade.
A WTO agreement on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would
also facilitate an increasingly broader and deeper global consensus on the trade-
offs between welfare maximization and distributive justice. WTO decision-
making might better articulate and help implement a conception of the good
global society.57 Under this approach one avoids the extreme positions of, on
53. See Conclusions and Implications, Part IV, infra text and accompanying notes. In the
important short term, moreover, inclusion of a judgments proposal in the agenda for the next negoti-
ating round may well be necessary to secure continued support in the U.S. for continued institution-
alization of world trade and, perhaps, even continued U.S. acquiescence in China's membership in
the WTO, as the danger of low-cost PRC exports free from effective externalization of the costs of
negligence in production looms on the American horizon.
54. See Eyal Benveniste, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1681
(1999) (extending Albert Hirshman's insights in EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970) to participation
of under-represented groups at international organizations through global public interest organiza-
tions); but see Peter Spiro, The New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the
'Unregulated' Marketplace, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 957 (1996) [hereinafter Spiro, New Global
Potentates] (offering a more critical view of global public interest organizations as potentially unac-
countable and antidemocratic).
55. Cf Oona A. Hathaway, Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Indus-
try Demands for Protection, 52 INT'L ORG. 575 (noting that interest group attitudes toward trade
liberalization may be dynamic, such that progressive enmeshment in free trade tends to reduce the
political support for protectionism as the groups that would suffer costs from increased free trade
slowly change their practices so that further liberalization becomes less costly). Hathaway's insight
about the effect of trade liberalization on protectionist groups arguably would work in the other
direction as well, for increased participation of formerly protectionist groups in the WTO would tend
to broaden the perspective of WTO policy-making.
56. Something like this might have happened to the International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling, which started out as a fisheries management regime but was transformed into an
animal rights organization as the balance of power among the membership moved from states having
an economic interest in the continuation of whaling to states lacking such an economic interest but
philosophically committed to whale preservation. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS
130 (1995); see also Antonio F. Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty? Or: Changing Norms Concerning
Sovereignty in International Law, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 463, 476-77 (1996) [hereinafter Perez, Who
Killed Sovereignty?] (reviewing THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY and critiquing its failure to take account of
such fundamental value conflicts).
57. For more about the good society concept, see Amitai Etzioni, Law in Civil Society, Good
Society, and the Prescriptive State, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 355 (2000) (distinguishing between a
"civil" society, a "good" society and a "prescriptive" state; such that the civil society is grounded on
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the one hand, radical state or private sector autonomy when private international
law ignores community needs and, on the other, the eradication of state sover-
eignty or private sector autonomy when international organs impose public in-
ternational law from above. Indeed, the ambiguous legal environment would
reflect the ambiguous sources of value in the modern international legal system,
sources that now require multiple modes of representation. These sources range
from participation in policy-making of the society of states, 58 the society of
peoples, 59 and the other forms of community that are emerging in global politics
through non-territorially-based communities, 60 founded on criteria as diverse as
membership in economic organizations, classes or businesses, religious faiths,
6 1
or perhaps even in internet chat-rooms. 62 Accordingly, increased legitimacy
would flow both from a quasi-utilitarian standpoint, because WTO decisions
would more likely then reflect the greatest good for the greatest number, and a
quasi-republican standpoint, because WTO decision-making would also more
likely represent the conclusions of reasoned debate at the global level.6 3
A Road Map
Part I of this Article provides context by analyzing the history of municipal
approaches to the problem of recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments and contrasting the constitutional and quasi-constitutional approaches
- of the U.S. with respect to state court judgments and the E.U with respect to
member state judgments - with the traditional private international law approach
human autonomy, a good society relies primarily on informal means of social control to establish a
balance of autonomy and duty forming the good character of its members, and a prescriptive state
ordains and enforces the public spiritedness of its citizens). Etzioni's conception of a good society is
the one most consistent with the vision of the international society of states and the emerging civil
society of peoples articulated in this essay.
58. See BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY, supra note 15.
59. See RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 13.
60. See GIDON GOTrLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE: A NEW APPROACH TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS
AND THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGNTY 7-47 (1993) (arguing that sovereignty can be fractioned, thus
making possible multiple, overlapping sovereignties rather than the internal sovereignty of a single
nation-state).
61. See COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD: THE REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1995) [hereinafter COMMISSION, OUR GLOBAL
NEIGHBORHOOD] (report of privately organized group of former world leaders describing the diffu-
sion of sovereignty and the increasing role of transnational groups in global governance).
62. See FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE: HOW THE COMMUNICATIONS
REVOLUTION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES 257-79 (1997) (arguing that the telecommunications revolu-
tion is enabling the emergence of politics and governance outside of normal modes dominated by
nation-states).
63. These arguments make no effort to prioritize between utilitarian or republican conceptions
of the relationship between trade and other values, such as environmental or labor, affected by trade.
But see MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(1988) (arguing that environmental values are misconceived as welfare maximization problems re-
quiring governmental intervention to correct for market failure, and that they are rather "moral,
aesthetic, cultural, and political" problems that must be "addressed in those terms"). Consistent with
Rawls' view that public discourse should be conducted in terms that accommodate reasonable com-
prehensive views, including utilitarianism and republicanism, this paper assumes that comparative
institutional analysis of the recognition and enforcement of judgments must invoke both utilitarian
and republican arguments.
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of courts in the U.S. with respect to foreign country judgments. It shows why
the asymmetries in U.S. and E.U. policy, coupled with changing patterns of
world trade, have focussed attention on recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments as a trade issue. It then develops the argument that recognition and en-
forcement of judgments is now a global trade issue meriting attention in light of
the potential inconsistency of current rules and practices with accepted princi-
ples of free and fair trade. Finally, it notes the increasing significance of civil
litigation in areas related to trade that may need to be addressed in a full-blown
trade approach to the problem of non-recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments. Part II describes and evaluates efforts to address this trade issue through
a multilateral treaty negotiated at the Hague Conference on Private International
Law. It argues that a multilateral treaty is too inflexible to negotiate tradeoffs
between trade and non-trade values and that it is unlikely to provide the basis for
revisiting those tradeoffs, which in turn precludes legal adaptation to reflect the
evolving views of relevant domestic and international constituencies. Part Ill
considers whether a WTO regime is a suitable alternative for addressing the
shortcomings of constitutional and private international law approaches. It con-
siders the relative advantages and disadvantages of these institutional strategies
in the resolution of the problem of the trade-related dimensions of recognition
and enforcement of judgments. Finally, Part IV appends some final speculations
concerning the implications of pursuing a WTO solution for emerging transna-
tional civil society and governance.
I.
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW SOLUTIONS
The essential problem, from a U.S. perspective, is a perceived asymmetry
in the relative recognition 64 and enforcement 65 of foreign judgments between
the U.S. and the rest of the world, in particular major U.S. trading partners who
are members of the European Union. The claim is that U.S. courts are generally
receptive to enforcing foreign judgments, while foreign courts are inclined either
not to enforce U.S. judgments or to otherwise discriminate against U.S. citizens
by exercising exorbitant jurisdiction over them. The reasons for this phenome-
non, if true,6 6 are varied, but they flow in large part from unique features of U.S.
64. Recognition refers to the effect given by a domestic court to a foreign country judgment
when the domestic court relies on the foreign ruling to bar litigation of a particular claim or issue on
the ground that it has previously been litigated abroad. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS, §§ 93-98, ch. 5, topic 2 Introductory note (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW, § 481 cmts. a & b (1987). See generally GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIvIL LITIGATION
IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 936 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION].
65. Enforcement refers to the effect given by a domestic court to a foreign country judgment
when the domestic court relies on the foreign ruling to order compliance with the foreign award,
typically a money judgment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 99-102, ch. 5,
topic 3 Introductory note (1971); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 481 cmts. a
& b (1987). See generally BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIvIL LITIGATION, supra note 64.
66. But it is important to recognize that at present no statistical evidence exists to verify
whether such a discrepancy truly exists in practice. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judg-
ments Convention?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. I 11, 115-16 (1998) [hereinafter Juenger, A Hague Judg-
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constitutional law of jurisdiction and from the unique characteristics of the U.S.
remedial system for tort liability. The effects of resistance to the U.S. legal
system are exacerbated in Europe by the consolidation of the European Commu-
nity, and now the European Union, into an international actor. Together with
changing patterns of world trade, which now confront U.S. consumers with even
more extreme discrepancies between U.S. legal culture and that of major East
Asian U.S. importers, the trade effects may well be substantial for the U.S. Fi-
nally, these practices and effects, if not technically inconsistent with interna-
tional trade law principles, conflict with the fundamental policies of the trade
law regime and thus warrant a global solution. At the same time, any attempt to
develop a solution will run headlong into the increased use of civil law judg-
ments to vindicate international human rights and environmental norms, some-
times in conflict with trade-related interests.
A. Sources of Asymmetry in U.S. Treatment of Foreign Judgments
The common understanding is that U.S. practice in the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments is rooted in the seminal U.S. Supreme Court
decision Hilton v. Guyot.67 The Court, noting that in France a U.S. judgment
would be reviewed again on the merits, refused to give effect to a French judg-
ment against a citizen of the United States. Justice Gray for the majority
observed:
The reasonable, if not necessary, conclusion appears to us to be that judgments
rendered in France or in any other foreign country by the laws of which our own
judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and con-
clusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evidence only
of the justice of the plaintiff's claim. In holding such a judgment, for want of
reciprocity, not to be conclusive evidence of the merits of the claim, we do not
proceed upon any theory of retaliation upon one person by reason of injustice
done to another, but upon the broad ground that international law is founded upon
mutuality and reciprocity, and that by the principles of international law recog-
nized in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it is
our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be consid-
ered conclusive.
6 8
The practical effect of the reciprocity requirement was, however, to create some-
thing of a Catch-22: if both the judgment rendering state (Fl) and the judgment
enforcing state (F2) adopted the reciprocity requirement, as Justice Gray sup-
posed was a common practice among states,69 then Fl would not give automatic
ments Convention?] ("[T]he concededly anecdotal evidence I have been able to collect by reading
foreign cases and literature suggests that European courts rarely render judgments against American
citizens or enterprises that have no 'minimum contacts' with the foreign forum."); Russell J. Wein-
traub, How Substantial is our Need for a Judgments-Recognition Convention and What Should We
Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 167, 170-71 [hereinafter Weintraub, How Substan-
tial is our Need] (noting absence of empirical evidence substantiating claim that U.S. judgments are
not recognized and enforced abroad and offering personal estimate that, although this may have been
a problem in the past, it is no longer a significant problem for "judgments obtained by U.S. lawyers
who follow proper procedures").
67. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
68. Id. at 227-28.
69. Justice Gray noted:
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effect to the judgments of F2, and F2 as a consequence would not give auto-
matic effect to judgments of Fl.
A game-theoretic treatment of the problem explains why neither the U.S.
nor other states would have moved to enforcement of each other's judgments
except on condition of reciprocity. One might argue that the situation took the
form of the problem of the Prisoners' Dilemma. 70 In this classic of game the-
ory, two criminals by cooperating and not informing on each other avoid ex-
tended sentences. However, each could suffer the so-called sucker's payoff of
an extremely long sentence by not cooperating with the police while the other
confessed. Meanwhile, the confessing player would receive an intermediate
sentence that avoided the sucker's payoff but also forbore the opportunity to
obtain the shortest possible sentence. Accordingly, it would be rational for each
player to choose avoiding the sucker's payoff by confessing, because neither
player would be assured of the other's cooperation. Making ordinary assump-
tions about risk aversion, the expected utility of non-cooperation would exceed
the expected utility of cooperation, including the sucker's payoff.
The situation might not be so grim, for it has also been described as a so-
called Stag Hunt, in which the incentives for defection are somewhat less than
those under the expected utilities described in the Prisoners' Dilemma. 7' The
Stag Hunt supposes that the sucker's payoff of catching only the rabbit rather
than the cooperative payoff of capturing the stag renders the cost of non-recipro-
cal cooperation less onerous than that in the Prisoners' Dilemma. If this is so,
one expects greater willingness to risk cooperation, and thereby suffer the
sucker's payoff, in a Stag Hunt scenario than one would expect in a situation
typified by Prisoners' Dilemma payoffs. Non-cooperation may nonetheless be a
common strategy under Stag Hunt payoffs, since a modest payoff for individual
action will always exceed the sucker's payoff, even if the Stag Hunt problem's
payoffs are thought to generate only defensive incentives for defection.72
In France and in a few smaller States ... the merits of the controversy are reviewed,
as of course, allowing the foreign judgment, at the most, no more effect than of being
prima facie evidence of the justice of the claim. In the great majority of the countries
on the continent of Europe ... and in a great part of South America, the judgment
rendered in a foreign country is allowed the same effect only as the courts of that
country allow to the judgments of the country in which the judgment in question is
sought to be executed.
Id. at 227.
70. See DOUcLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994); AVINASH K. Dixrr &
BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BusINESS, PoLrrIcs
AND EVERYDAY LIFE I 1-14, 89-115 (1991).
71. See Brand, Judgments as a Trade Law Issue, supra note 34, at 622-23 n.120 (discussing a
Stag Hunt model of reciprocal enforcement of foreign country judgments).
72. Id. at 622-26. See Kenneth Abbott, "Trust But Verify": The Production of Information in
Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 4-8 (1993)
(distinguishing between "offensive" and "defensive" incentives for defection); see also Whincop,
The Recognition Scene, supra note 23, at 420 (distinguishing between games with payoffs giving
rise to true cooperation problems, such as the Prisoners' Dilemma, and games giving rise to mere
coordination problems, in which both players are better off employing a cooperative strategy but that
strategy is not self-selecting).
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Under either scenario, however, the logic of non-cooperation holds only
under limited conditions, principally non-iteration and finite time horizons.73
This is so because in an iterated or repeated game cooperation is possible
through strategic signaling.7 4 This signaling of future cooperation can induce
cooperative commitments so long as players play under an indefinite time hori-
zon, because it is only when the game has a fixed endpoint that one is able to
calculate a series of moves resulting in a significant sucker's payoff at the end of
the game. Because Axelrod showed that tit-for-tat could lead to cooperation
even under Prisoners' Dilemma payoffs, tit-for-tat would a fortiori lead to coop-
eration under the more favorable Stag Hunt payoffs that some argue characterize
the recognition and enforcement of judgments problem.
Thus, the reciprocity criterion stated in Hilton v. Guyot would seem reason-
ably calculated to employ a tit-for-tat strategy. 75 In other words, the U.S. courts
would offer to reward cooperation and punish non-cooperation by the courts of
other states. Moreover, shortly after Hilton, U.S. courts seemed to have already
taken the first step of offering cooperation in a tit-for-tat strategy by relaxing the
reciprocity requirement under exceptions stated in Hilton itself.76 Such an ap-
proach would have signaled a willingness to cooperate, for it would have created
uncertainty about the existence of the reciprocity requirement. This uncertainty
could have induced foreign courts to find that U.S. courts would recognize and
enforce foreign awards, but for the applicability of narrow exceptions. It is pos-
sible such a strategy, if maintained, would have resulted in the widespread rec-
ognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in Europe and elsewhere. It is
argued that the failure of U.S. courts to sustain a requirement of reciprocity over
time is evidence that the problem was never really significant. 77 However,
whether continued judicial insistence on reciprocity would have induced foreign
states to recognize and enforce U.S. judgments or whether the failure to conform
to a policy of reciprocity evidenced the absence of incentives for strategic be-
havior is more likely a moot question because intervening developments in U.S.
law frustrated any chance to achieve those results.
73. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
74. See id. at 27-54 (discussing the superiority of tit-for-tat strategies).
75. See Whincop, The Recognition Scene, supra note 23, at 424 ("The early law on recogni-
tion in the United States imposed a reciprocity requirement. Although the formal reason for this was
described as 'comity', it is easier to understand as a punishment for defecting states.") (footnotes
omitted).
76. One court in an early case treated the reciprocity requirement as dictum, since the Supreme
Court might have denied enforcement on the ground that the F1 judgment was procured through
fraud. See Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381 (Ct. App. 1926).
77. Analyzing early U.S. law for evidence of strategic behavior, Whincop reads the rapid
departure from reciprocity as a general condition for enforcement in the U.S., as well as the U.K.'s
consistent rejection of reciprocity, as evidence that the problem may never have been perceived as a
Prisoner's Dilemma. See Whincop, The Recognition Scene, supra note 23, at 424. On the other
hand, Whincop rejects the vested rights theory explanation for automatic enforcement of foreign
judgments and the absence of a condition of reciprocity and thus acknowledges that the "process of
judgment recognition provides the opportunity to choose not to recognise judgments thought to
represent uncooperative behaviour." Id. at 424.
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Rather, U.S. courts moved away from the reciprocity regime for unrelated
reasons. In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,78 the Supreme Court abolished the gen-
eral federal common law upon which Hilton v. Guyot was founded. Lower fed-
eral courts came to assume that the question of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments was a question of state common law in the absence of con-
trolling federal or state statutes.79 Indeed, one reading of Johnston v. Compa-
gnie Generale Transatlantique8° is that a state interested in inducing foreigners
to invest capital within its boundaries, by expressing a more favorable attitude
than the federal government toward recognition of foreign money judgments,
was prepared to place its own interests ahead of those of the nation as a whole.
8 1
In time, in light of criticism of the reciprocity requirement 82 and the absence of
a reciprocity requirement in the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Act
(UFMJA),8 3 the pattern of decisions applying state law was thought, with some
exceptions, to dispense with the reciprocity requirement. 84 The absence of reci-
procity as a general criterion thus opened the door to widespread recognition of
foreign country judgments in the U.S., but without the ambiguous threat of non-
recognition when foreign courts do not give reciprocal treatment to judgments
rendered by U.S. courts. This arguably evidenced a competitive race-to-the-
bottom among U.S. states in their relations with foreign judicial systems.
85
78. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The continuing role of special federal common law relating to foreign
relations or international law in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in U.S. courts
remains undetermined, although some courts have suggested in dictum that these considerations
cannot be ignored. See, e.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex.
1980); see generally BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 64, at 961 (citing relevant
authority).
79. Somportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
80. 242 N.Y. 381 (Ct. App. 1926) (pre-Erie New York state court case misreading the Hilton
v. Guyot holding on this point as dictum and relying instead on the independent exception for fraud
as a ground for nonenforcement).
81. See generally OLSON, COLLECTIVE ACTION, supra note 4. Olson's central argument is that
one who cannot be excluded from a benefit does not have an incentive to contribute to its provision.
Thus, a state's constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over foreign persons and render judg-
ments against them to be enforced in-state or under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in a sister state
undercuts the formation of a common front among U.S. states in recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments on the basis of reciprocity toward judgments rendered in any of the U.S. states.
82. See, e.g., J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1385-1890 (1935) (views of chief reporter of FIRST
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered
Abroad, 50 COLuM. L. REV. 783, 790-93 (1950) (views of chief reporter of subsequent RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS).
83. While the UFMJA did not contemplate a reciprocity requirement, some states' implement-
ing legislation did contain provisions relating to reciprocity, either mandating reciprocity or treating
it as a discretionary ground for denial of recognition. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §9-12-
114(10)(1082) (2000) (reciprocity is a mandatory condition for recognition); TEX. Cirv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN §36.005(b)(7) (1986) (lack of reciprocity is discretionary basis for non-
recognition).
84. See BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIvIL LITIGATION, supra note 64, at 952-55 (detailing state and
federal practice).
85. Cf William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1437 (1992) (advancing a more limited
prediction of merely marginally inefficient competition); but see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Firm, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977) (advanc-
ing a race-to-the-top argument that state competition in producing corporate law was efficient). In
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A second important development was the transformation of the U.S. legal
system spawned by the revolution of U.S. jurisdictional law governing the reach
of state courts into multi-state and multi-national transactions, which conse-
quently increased the impact of the U.S. damages system. In part because of the
growth of interstate commerce and the increased mobility of persons in the
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court refocused the constitutional law of state
court jurisdiction on the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the forum
rather than on the Court's capacity to exercise power over that person.86 This
dramatically expanded the breadth of federal court jurisdiction in multi-state and
international cases. The reasonable foreseeability of the effects of the foreign
defendant's foreign conduct on the forum would ordinarily be sufficient to exer-
cise jurisdiction, even if the Supreme Court opined that mere foreseeability
would be insufficient to establish the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdic-
tion.87 The expansiveness of U.S. jurisdictional law is thought to enable U.S.
courts to exercise jurisdiction exorbitantly.8 8 The impact of this perceived ag-
gressive exercise of jurisdiction by state courts is magnified, moreover, by the
extraordinary damages that U.S. courts are prepared to authorize, and U.S. juries
are inclined to award, in products liability cases. The combination of these fac-
tors may so deeply ingrain European suspicions about the U.S. legal system that
any attempt to provide an explanation of the limits the U.S. Due Process Clause
imposes on U.S. state courts, particularly in international cases,8 9 may well be
met with disbelief. Those in other countries not conversant with the tension
between the broadest possible readings of judicial statements and the more
the foreign commerce context, balkanization of state policy is described in Peter J. Spiro, Foreign
Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223 (1999); but see Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (2000) (holding that federal Burma sanctions legislation preempted state
sanctions, largely because of the Executive Branch's capacity to speak for the U.S. in the negotiation
of multilateral sanctions). Crosby thus evidences Supreme Court deference to a congressional judg-
ment that uncoordinated state sanctions might yield a sanctions race-to-the-bottom.
86. Compare International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (focussing on "mini-
mum contacts"), with Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (grounding jurisdiction on the court's
physical power over the defendant). However, in upholding tag service of a defendant present in
California, the Supreme Court has suggested that power over the defendant through the defendant's
presence in the forum is still a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, irrespective of the reasonableness of
the exercise of jurisdiction under minimum contacts analysis. See Burnham v. Superior, 495 U.S.
604 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
87. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding mere fore-
seeability insufficient for purpose of finding personal jurisdiction over regional automobile distribu-
tor under the Due Process Clause).
88. See generally Ronald Brand, Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Conven-
tion, 60 U. Prrr. L. REv. 660 (1999) [hereinafter Brand, Due Process] (attempting to dispel these
notions through an exhaustive and convincing attempt to read U.S. due process jurisprudence
narrowly).
89. It is argued, for example, that a European court would have asserted jurisdiction in the
Asahi case, while the Supreme Court held that California could not under the Due Process Clause
assert jurisdiction in a dispute between two foreign parties on an indemnification claim even though
the tortious harm occurred in California. See Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Jurisdiction in the Con-
flict of Laws: Adding a Comparative Dimension, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 401 (1995).
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nuanced and restrained reality of common-law adjudication may particularly
disbelieve.
9 0
In sum, the supervening legal developments undermined the effectiveness
of a tit-for-tat strategy in securing the enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad.
The U.S. system for determining whether jurisdiction is proper became
grounded on constitutional concerns that are simply incomprehensible to most
countries that do not constitutionalize this question, and this new constitutional
analysis enabled the dramatic expansion of U.S. jurisdiction over foreign de-
fendants.9' At the same time, Erie suggested that states have authority to deter-
mine the conditions for recognition of foreign judgments in the U.S., which in
turn disabled the U.S. as a whole from compensating with tit-for-tat responses
for increased foreign non-recognition of U.S. judgments. Moving the carrots
and sticks of recognition and enforcement policy from the federal government to
the states may have disrupted the evolution of the tit-for-tat strategy initiated by
the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot as a rational response to a national prob-
lem of non-recognition and enforcement.
B. Sources of Asymmetry in E. U. Treatment of Foreign Judgments
In contrast, the courts of the E.U. countries have lacked an incentive, as
well as the power arguably, to open their doors to the recognition and enforce-
ment of U.S. judgments. They may lack the power to exercise the kind of dis-
cretion that common-law courts can exercise in implementing a tit-for-tat regime
leading to mutual recognition, because the civil law tradition does not, in theory
at least, empower courts to make the policy judgments that seem embedded in a
tit-for-tat approach.92 The courts of E.U. countries have lacked an interest in
doing so because they have in effect been able to "free ride" on U.S. courts that
grant recognition and enforcement of most E.U. judgments without the require-
ment of reciprocity. Finally, the constitutional evolution of the E.U. made coop-
eration with the U.S. even more difficult.
One might argue that, even if most U.S. jurisdictions had imposed a reci-
procity requirement, it would not have been in the interest of most E.U. coun-
tries to respond to the U.S. reciprocity criterion by beginning to enforce U.S.
judgments until recently. This is because U.S. firms traditionally had relatively
more capital invested in Europe than European firms had invested in the U.S.
The same could be said about a number of emerging capital-exporting countries
around the world. Under these conditions, judgments against U.S. firms in Eu-
90. Brand, Due Process, supra note 88, at 687 ("To a lawyer from a civil law system, accus-
tomed to the relative structure of code-type lists of jurisdictional rules, and reasoning from general
principles often more certain than the concept of due process, [a] trip through U.S. case law must
seem rather confusing.").
91. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutionalizing German Jurisdictional Law, 44 AM. J.
COMP. L. 521 (1996) (casting doubt on correctness of Pennoyer v. Neff approach of constitutionaliz-
ing jurisdiction).
92. See JACKSON AND TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTrrtriONAL LAw 663-66 (1999) (drawing
on work of civilian scholarship to explain the resistance to "lawmaking" of courts in the civil law
tradition).
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rope were more likely to be immediately enforceable in Europe against the Eu-
ropean assets of U.S. firms than U.S. judgments in the U.S. against foreign
assets in the U.S. This relative asymmetry exposed U.S. firms to greater risk of
judicial enforcement in European countries than European firms faced in the
U.S. Thus, E.U. courts seeking to vindicate their nationals' interests had less
incentive than U.S. courts seeking to vindicate the interests of U.S. nationals to
cooperate in creating a non-negotiated regime for mutual recognition and en-
forcement of each other's judgments.93
Changing capital flows would in theory change these incentives, however.
Admittedly, at first a state in the E.U. with few local assets in the territory of
foreign creditors will have little incentive to deter such creditor states, such as
the U.S., from adopting laws preferring local creditors.94 However, the costs of
non-cooperation for the E.U. would increase as U.S. creditors become better
able to enforce their E.U. judgments against E.U. nationals operating in the U.S.
against E.U. property located in the U.S. Thus, over time, as E.U. investments
in the U.S. increased, the interests of E.U. courts in protecting their own nation-
als should have encouraged them to show greater receptivity toward recognition
and enforcement of U.S. judgments.
Yet, even if the diminution of asymmetric investment stimulates a mutual
recognition regime, this factor is clearly outweighed by the influence of the
emergence of the European Economic Community in driving E.U. countries to-
ward non-recognition of U.S. judgments. In contrast to the U.S. regime toward
foreign judgments, the countries of the European Community negotiated an in-
ternal regime via a multilateral convention that discriminates against the recog-
nition and enforcement of non-EC judgments. The so-called Brussels
Convention was then extended to the countries of the European Free Trade Area
(EFTA), many of which have since entered the E.U., through the so-called
Lugano Convention. Taken together, the Brussels-Lugano Convention system
comprised a unified law for the recognition and enforcement of EC/EFTA
judgments.
More important, the E.U. has now taken steps to implement the Brussels
Convention as a matter of E.U. law by issuing a draft regulation that will ulti-
mately compel E.U. member states to implement the rules of the Brussels Con-
vention as part of their national laws.95 This will make compliance with the
substance of the Brussels rules a right of individuals in the E.U., which may be
enforced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The binding quality of ECJ
decisions now effectively guarantees the E.U. common market and thereby pro-
93. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Andrew Guzman have made a similar argument in the related
context of assessing whether asymmetry of investment would prevent the evolution of national bank-
ruptcy taws toward a globally welfare-enhancing universalist approach, rather than a territorialist
approach under which states effectively prefer local creditors. See Bebchuk and Guzman, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 805-07 (1999).
94. See id.
95. See supra note 29. As a matter of E.U. law, this approach appears to be legally sustaina-
ble. See Brand, supra note 34, at 617-18 (noting the acknowledgment in 1994 by the European
Court of Justice of the relationship between trade law and judgments recognition and enforcement).
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motes the continuing process of political integration. In sum, it might be as-
sumed that the Brussels Convention rules will have effects similar to those of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution in furthering economic
and political integration and in further reducing the competitive opportunities of
persons outside the E.U. Certainly the workings of the Brussels-Lugano system
further the aims of European economic integration, although the retention of a
public policy exception in the E.U. regime9 6 seems to tolerate greater diversity
than does the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
9 7
C. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments As a Trade Issue
The Brussels system, unlike the Full Faith and Credit Clause, explicitly
discriminates against judgments rendered by foreign states. It does so by mak-
ing some bases for non-recognition or non-enforcement of a foreign judgment
inapplicable with respect to judgments rendered against a non-domiciliary of a
Brussels-Lugano country.98 If then, for example, a French court renders an
award against a U.S. person not domiciled in an EC or EFTA country based on a
jurisdictional ground that would deny the enforcement if rendered against a
domiciliary of an EC or EFTA country, the judgment would, nonetheless, be
enforceable against the U.S. citizen's assets anywhere in the EC or EFTA. The
practical implications of this discrimination are clear with respect to the compar-
ative risks faced by the U.S. person and an EC or EFTA person doing business
in France. The U.S. person suffers greater legal risk of enforcement of any
claims that might arise from the transaction. To the extent that the U.S. person
and EC/EFTA person are competing for trade opportunities in France, the U.S.
person will be at a relative disadvantage.
It is not clear, however, that this practice amounts to a violation of GATT's
rules. As an E.U. scholar has argued, such measures may not conflict with
GATT's nondiscrimination obligations because they are framed in terms of
domicile rather than nationality.9 9 Nonetheless, the preceding hypothetical crys-
tallizes the undeniable effect of the increased legal risk, amounting to an unlevel
playing field, for U.S. persons doing business with domiciliaries of E.U. and
EFTA countries. Moreover, the effect of the Brussels rules may be to operate as
a disguised discrimination against non-E.U. nations, which might well be action-
able under the WTO.
96. See Brussels Convention, supra note 27, art. 27(1).
97. In the language of dissenting Justice White in Fauntleroy v. Lum, the majority's rejection
of a public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause "so enlarges that clause as to cause it
to obliterate all state lines." Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 239 (1908) (White J., dissenting).
98. See the Brussels Convention, supra note 27, art. 4; Lugano Convention, supra note 28, art.
4.
99. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the European
Communities, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1211 (1984) (criticizing this discrimination); but see MAT-
THIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH THE JUNGLE 71
(1995) [hereinafter REIMANN, A GUIDE THROUGH THE JUNGLE] (arguing that, because the discrimina-
tion is based expressly on domicile rather than nationality, it is not a violation of either the most
favored nation or national treatment principles of the GATT).
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The E.U. is now seeking to incorporate the Brussels/Lugano system into
the body of E.U. law.' 0 0 For this reason, recent scholarship has encouraged
U.S. policymakers to renew efforts to achieve a treaty-based solution that strives
for maximum enforcement of U.S. judgments abroad through the negotiation of
a multilateral convention at the Hague Conference on Private International
Law.' 01 Moreover, as argued below, the jurisprudence of the WTO supports
treating recognition and enforcement of judgments as a trade solution. Finally,
while there appears to be no empirical confirmation of asymmetric recognition
and enforcement of U.S. judgments in the E.U., and legal scholars appear to be
divided,' 0 2 there seems to be considerable interest and support in the U.S. prac-
titioner community. Yet, U.S. trial lawyers appear more concerned about the
risk that U.S. judgments will not be enforced in countries that are emerging as
importers into the U.S., principally the countries of East Asia where large
volumes of consumer products are produced and later brought to the U.S.1
0 3
The products liability concerns are potentially staggering. This is because the
U.S. Supreme Court gave U.S. practitioners further concern about the scope of
the problem by suggesting in the Asahi case that foreign manufacturers could
avoid personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts by keeping their operations out of the
U.S. and importing through essentially judgment proof intermediaries.
10 4
In sum, the appearance of asymmetry, combined with the perception of an
emerging liability issue derived from changing global trade flows, has generated
pressure in the U.S. for a global approach to recognition and enforcement of
judgments as a trade problem and stimulated an effort to seek a solution at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law. At the same time, trade-related
interests face the challenge of an increasing public perception of the external
costs of trade and attempts to vindicate those interests through litigation.
D. Human Rights and Environmental Interests in Judgments
The very expansiveness that drives U.S. jurisdictional and liability law with
respect to trade-related interests has increased opportunities to use the federal
courts to vindicate non-trade related interests. For example, American lawyers
have recently utilized the Alien Tort Claims Act (the Act) 10 5 to challenge the
labor practices of U.S. oil firms operating in Nigeria.' 0 6 The Act has in the past
been interpreted to permit suit by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defend-
100. See supra note 29.
101. See Brand, Judgments as a Trade Issue, supra note 34.
102. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 89, 94 n.28 (1999). For additional discussion of the empirical question of asymmetric enforce-
ment, see authorities cited in supra note 66.
103. See Matthew Vita, Senate Approves Normalized Trade With China, WASH. POST, Sept. 20,
2000, at A01.
104. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
106. See Go Global, Sue Local, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 54.
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ants. 10 7 Buttressed by the Supreme Court's possible reaffirmation of transient
or so-called "tag" jurisdiction,' 0 8 the Act may well allow the U.S. human rights
community to vindicate the rights of foreign persons through generous U.S.
judgments. As U.S. case law makes clear, the punitive damages of U.S. reme-
dies for common-law torts may well be available for analogous "torts" cogniza-
ble under the Act in violation of international law.' ° 9 Similarly, emerging
environmental law norms may well generate similar tort-like claims cognizable
under the Alien Tort Claims Act." 0
It is unnecessary, for purposes of this argument, to evaluate the ultimate
merit of invoking the Act to serve these purposes. Suffice it to say that the
practice of U.S. states in creating private rights of action to vindicate human
rights norms, such as California's recent statute vindicating the interests of Hol-
ocaust survivors, suggests that future developments in this area are likely."'
Creative lawyers can exploit these litigation opportunities to vindicate interests
that are inadequately addressed through the political process, much as civil
rights activists in the United States creatively invoked long-buried principles of
racial equality in the U.S. Constitution to seek judicial remedies to entrenched
discrimination. The enforcement of such "civil" judgments would arguably fall
within the ambit of a treaty solution to the recognition of judgments grounded
on commercial rights. Some kind of balance would need to be struck in defining
the kinds of civil judgments that would further trade interests and those that
would further non-trade interests. What protection each would receive under
international law would need to be determined. Perhaps hardest of all, rules for
dealing with cases in which both trade and non-trade interests are implicated
would need to be fashioned. Yet, this is a matter of increasing importance as
U.S. trade flows continue to shift toward non-European suppliers and export
markets,"12 where the conflicts between U.S. and foreign environmental and
labor values would seem to be the greatest.
II.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION AT THE HAGUE CONFERENCE
Nonetheless, an attempt to address this problem in the context of a multilat-
eral convention like the traditional Hague private law conventions is neither ne-
gotiable nor likely to be effective in achieving U.S. trade-related goals. The
treaty would be ineffective largely because the means by which such treaties are
107. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980) (holding an act of torture committed by an
alien against an alien on foreign territory was nonetheless actionable in U.S. courts as a cognizable
violation of the law of nations within the meaning of the Alien Tort Claims Act).
108. See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (Scalia, J, plurality
opinion).
109. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D. N.Y.1984).
110. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 241-42, para. 29 (July
8), 35 I.L.M. 809 (emphasizing the importance of international environmental obligations).
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 354.5 (West 2000).
112. See International Trade Administration, US Foreign Trade Highlights, US Commodity
Trade by Geographic Area, http:\\www.ita.doc.gov/d/industry/otea/usfth.
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implemented and amended preclude the kind of legal mutation required in the
politically-charged balance between trade and non-trade concerns. The treaty
would be non-negotiable because, under a straightforward application of game
theory, the negotiating dynamic of a multilateral convention discourages stake-
holders from achieving optimal joint gains in trade and non-trade values. Fi-
nally, even if the treaty could be implemented and negotiated, the rules
orientation of the Hague Convention model would encourage continued bilateral
responses to conflicts concerning the treaties' implementation rather than a mul-
tilateral bargaining process in which rational and transparent negotiations might
lead to better results.
A. Barriers to Effective Implementation of a Hague Convention
With respect to implementation, the central objection is that a Hague Treaty
cannot serve effectively as a vehicle for political evolution. Once it is con-
cluded, a Hague Convention would create permanent sets of proponents and
opponents. If such a multilateral treaty ever did enter into force, changes in the
political basis for supporting the tradeoff between trade and non-trade values
would undercut support for the rules of the treaty reflecting the political consen-
sus at the Hague Conference. Multilateral treaties of this kind are rarely, if ever,
amended. Without an effective formal mechanism to adapt the treaty to respond
to changing political views, the treaty would become anachronistic. It might be
honored in the breach, through more frequent use of the escape devices that
would inevitably be built into it. To the extent that judicial interpretation re-
flects changing political consensus in a particular country, the implementation of
the treaty would vary substantially. This variation would defeat the treaty's
chief objective of overcoming disincentives to cooperation among states in their
pursuit of global free trade goals. In the absence of an agreed upon final inter-
preting mechanism, auto-interpretation of the treaty would erode its value in
assuring a stable set of commitments, even if cabined by the doctrine of good
faith.
11 3
Moreover, it seems unlikely that mutation or common interpretation could
be achieved through a supranational dispute resolution mechanism. States
would probably not accept a final supranational arbiter of the disputes that
would typically be governed by the treaty. For example, it was extremely diffi-
cult for the United States to agree to allow the Canada-U.S. Dispute Settlement
Panel to determine whether U.S. courts were applying the appropriate standard
under the Canada-U.S. Free Table Agreement in their assessment of antidump-
ing and countervailing duty cases. 114 The domestic constitutional questions at-
tending that issue are as yet unresolved. Moreover, that was a public law
113. See J. F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1991); but see Antonio F.
Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Contin-
uing Right of International Atomic Energy Safeguards 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 749, 774-81 (1994) (ques-
tioning the utility of the concept of good faith in the case of auto-interpretation).
114. See generally Charles M. Gastle, Policy Alternatives For Reform of the Free Trade Agree-
ment of the Americas: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms, 26 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 735 (1995)
(discussing the difficulties of dispute resolution in the area of antidumping cases).
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controversy. Many would consider it even more problematic for the U.S. to
agree to allow supranational case-by-case review of judicial interpretation of
private law controversies where established domestic values are enshrined in
common-law principles in property, tort and contract law. In the absence of
supranational case-by-case review, however, states would be allowed to vary
their interpretation of the treaty in accordance with their own values.
It is likely that states would find it difficult to balance effectively trade and
non-trade values in this context. This is because the treaty would likely be im-
plemented directly into national law with little, if any, additional legislative at-
tention to the tradeoffs between trade and non-trade values. This is likely
because treaty proponents would try to avoid complicating its adoption with
what they perceive to be extraneous concerns. If, however, implementing legis-
lation did address non-trade related concerns, the particular views expressed in
each ratification process would lead to amendments that would undercut pros-
pects for widespread ratification. On the other hand, if ratification were secured
through a legislative strategy that did not formally address the balance between
trade and non-trade concerns, the task of addressing those issues would devolve
to an unelected and politically-unaccountable judiciary. The judiciary might
lack the political capacity to adjust the meaning of the treaty to changing politi-
cal conceptions, assuming it is even desirable for a judiciary to do so. One
might risk reenactment of the era when U.S. federal courts struck down labor
agreements as contracts that violated antitrust laws. 11 5 Moreover, the judiciary,
especially the state judges who would hear most of the common-law claims
subject to the proposed Hague Convention, would probably not have the experi-
ence in foreign legal systems and economic practices sufficient to assess the
validity of certain business practices. Thus, even if some judges could apply
provisions of the treaty that balanced trade and non-trade concerns to take ac-
count of changing domestic values, it is doubtful that most could get it right
uniformly. The judicial error rate is bound to be significant.
B. Barriers to Effective Negotiation of a Hague Convention
Even if a Hague treaty could adapt to changing political circumstances, it is
doubtful that the treaty could effectively balance trade and non-trade concerns,
even at its inception. Because a multilateral treaty is not capable of mutating in
meaning to correspond to a changing global political balance, stakeholders in the
treaty would perceive the initial negotiation as a one-shot deal. Although propo-
nents of trade and non-trade values would have an interest in cooperating to
achieve their respective goals, stakeholders might perceive the situation as a
Prisoner's Dilemma, in which cooperation involves risking exploitation during
the implementation phase. For example, a proponent of labor rights attempting
to invoke a treaty provision requiring enforcement of a judgment relating to
defective products produced through substandard working conditions, might
find that the domestic understanding of substandard working conditions varied
115. See HOVENKAMP, ANTiTRUST LAW, supra note 5.
2001]
70 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
from the international understanding embedded in the treaty. An advocate of
labor rights might fear that the non-enforceability of a judgment on substandard
working conditions might further entrench the practice rather than raise the costs
of employing it.
Game theory suggests, however, that iterated (repeat play) games - even
Prisoners' Dilemma games - may foster cooperation that would not occur in
single-play games. This is because iterated games allow players to signal their
cooperation, reward reciprocal cooperation, and penalize non-cooperation. One
might consider, therefore, whether a multilateral treaty that is perceived by
stakeholders as a game that encourages non-cooperation might nonetheless per-
mit cooperation in advancing both trade and non-trade values if it were per-
ceived as an iterated game. Yet, this possibility is unlikely to be realized for
several reasons.
First, the defined time horizon would undercut the perception of iteration.
Admittedly, the stakeholders, particularly in countries like the United States
which can treat a treaty as non-self-executing domestically, might perceive the
negotiation as involving an additional requirement to implement legislation do-
mestically. But game theory also predicts that an iterated game with a defined
endpoint where most of the payoffs occur is functionally identical to a single-
play game. This is because each player calculates whether the other player has
the incentive and capacity to exploit efforts to cooperate. If so, the game
reduces to the final moves of each player and, thus, a single-play game. Accord-
ingly, for international stakeholders whose gains come from domestic treaty im-
plementation, domestic implementation would not change the nature of the
negotiating incentives at the international level.
Second, stakeholders in the multilateral negotiation might not perceive the
domestic negotiation as a meaningful iteration of the same multilateral game.
This would be true if, for example, non-trade-related stakeholders have substan-
tially less access to the negotiation process and to the process of formulating the
negotiating position of each national participant than they would have in the
domestic implementation phase in the legislative process. Even in the United
States, where public rights of participation are substantial, it is not clear that
those who participate in U.S. multilateral negotiations are the same people who
would influence domestic advice and consent to ratification. Public choice the-
ory predicts, for example, that groups with lower costs of organizing, and there-
fore monitoring and participating in the negotiating and implementing processes,
would have a relative advantage over groups with higher costs of organization in
the bureaucratic process within the State Department controlling negotiation of
the treaty compared to the relatively more transparent, legislative process for
treaty ratification and implementation. This is true even though the negotiating
process is informed by some political participation through the State Department
Advisory Committee on Private International Law and its Study Groups on the
Judgments Convention.
In fact, domestic negotiation might even be antithetical to the interests of
the stakeholders prevailing at the multilateral negotiation, further weakening
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their capacity to threaten retaliation against non-trade interests at the domestic
implementation phase. Any savvy participant in the multilateral negotiating
process would understand the boundaries for disciplinary retaliation in the do-
mestic implementation phase and would therefore perceive significant room for
deviating from prior commitments. Finally, politically savvy trade negotiators
would know that domestic implementation could erode trade-related gains. The
negotiator would therefore discount the value of negotiating partners' conces-
sions and would make fewer commitments in return. Similarly, stakeholders
relatively disadvantaged in the multilateral setting might have less of an interest
in making concessions in the multilateral setting because they would believe that
domestic implementation would give them an opportunity to achieve a relatively
better result. Thus, knowing all this, the stakeholders who were relatively ad-
vantaged in the formulation of the U.S.'s multilateral negotiation position would
not perceive the domestic negotiation on implementation to be a suitable vehicle
for disciplining opportunistic behavior by other participants in the multilateral
negotiation.
In sum, the negotiating dynamic of a single-play game is not improved, and
appears likely to be worsened, by incorporating a domestic legislative phase of
implementing a multilateral treaty produced at the Hague Conference. A multi-
lateral treaty would likely be perceived as a single-play game because the limits
on consensual mutation render each stage in the process a single-play game for
the relevant sets of players. Game theory therefore predicts that stakeholders in
the tradeoff between trade and non-trade values will engage in a sub-optimal
level of cooperation in a negotiating setting like the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law.
This would not be a serious concern if all it signified was a failure to
achieve gains that might otherwise be possible. However, to the extent the
Hague process does succeed in achieving some tradeoff between trade-related
and non-trade-related gains, it could have deleterious long-term effects. Any
effort to increase the recognition and enforcement of judgments that create
mainly trade-related gains would necessarily privilege or lock-in trade values
against non-trade values. This is because proponents of trade liberalization
might now oppose even a renegotiation that promised total welfare gains and
even trade gains. If, by hypothesis in a renegotiation, externalized costs of trade
are internalized to a greater degree than trade-related gains are created through
the renegotiation, this second attempt to address the tradeoffs between trade and
its externalities could reduce net returns for trade-related interests. Thus, trade-
related stakeholders could prefer to forgo the opportunity to achieve greater ab-
solute gains for trade because of the risk of suffering relative losses. In effect,
any solution at the Hague Conference would raise the opportunity costs for trade
interests succeeding in the Hague process of negotiating later at another forum
structured as an iterated game where joint gains could be more easily achieved.
Thus, the Hague Conference approach is not only unlikely to achieve the opti-
mal level of joint gains but it is also likely to make achieving the optimal level
of joint gains more difficult in any later negotiation for proponents of both trade
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and non-trade concerns. A possible example of this phenomenon is the diffi-
culty environmental interests now experience in protecting environmental values
at the WTO.
C. After the Hague: The Danger of Bilateralized Dispute Resolution
Finally, even if it were possible to surmount the barriers to successful im-
plementation of a multilateral convention like the Hague Conference model, the
substance of the tradeoff could not be negotiated in terms that would facilitate a
multilateral balance between trade and non-trade concerns. Because it would
develop norms that would ultimately address courts, the Hague Conference
would likely formulate rules rather than balancing principles. International
negotiators prefer to formulate rules when creating directives to courts because
they presume that rules are more acceptable to civil law cultures that purport to
deny their judiciaries the power to make law. Accordingly, the likeliest result of
the Hague Conference negotiation would be a framework of rules that purports
to provide a specific resolution to each case. The failure to enforce the treaty
rules in a particular case would constitute a breach. The rules orientation there-
fore compels a binary solution: either the treaty norm is followed or it is not.
Accordingly, the ordinary remedy for breach of obligations in civil law and
public international law is an order of specific relief, such as specific perform-
ance in contract law and the duty to make reparations in international law. Sub-
stitutional relief like that rewarded in American contract law is not the ordinary
case. Thus, the ordinary remedy for breach of a Hague Convention obligation
would likely be an international tribunal's directive to comply with the treaty
norm rather than some measure of damages for losses that the treaty was negoti-
ated to protect. However, when a municipality favors one interest over another
in a dispute between trade gains and the externalities of trade, the appropriate
remedy should be measured in terms of the lost non-trade gains (in other words,
the externalized costs of trade). Substitutional relief that compels a stakeholder
to internalize the externalities of trade through the payment of compensatory
relief would not be feasible under the international remedial law that has tradi-
tionally been applied; even if it were feasible to award substitutional relief for
failure to comply with the treaty's requirements, it would be undesirable to mea-
sure harm to the interests protected by the treaty in terms of the losses to indi-
vidual litigants who are denied the benefit of the treaty right. Awarding litigants
damages calculated in terms of losses of treaty-protected interests that might
bear no relation to the litigants' actual losses would be equally undesirable be-
cause it would produce either a windfall recovery or a grossly inadequate award
from the litigant's perspective.
Moreover, any attempt by judicial authorities to consider a treaty's underly-
ing desire to balance trade and non-trade interests would be seen as illegitimate,
not only in rules-oriented civilian cultures that abjure judicial discretion but also
in the United States under the evolving Supreme Court jurisprudence of choice
of international law. On par with the highly context-sensitive choice-of-law
revolution reflected in the work of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
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tions Law of the United States for international conflicts of law, U.S. courts
expressed receptivity to judicial interest balancing until the recent Hartford In-
surance case.1 6 In that case the U.S. Supreme Court moved away from a bal-
ancing approach and signaled a preference for bright-line rules. A rules
approach to conflict between two states' laws informs political actors that they
must accommodate their conflicting interests because the courts will not do that
job for them. Accordingly, courts will likely eschew discretionary balancing of
competing state interests in international cases following Hartford Insurance.
The net effect of (1) binary conceptions of the applicability of Hague Con-
vention rules, (2) remedial laws that direct parties to give specific relief in the
event of breach and (3) the inability of courts to balance the tradeoffs between
trade and non-trade values embedded in the multilateral treaty is to drive the
breaching and nonbreaching parties to treat the dispute in any individual case as
a simple conflict over the recognition and enforcement of a trade-related judg-
ment. The parties ignore the other state values and interests that might be impli-
cated. More important, because the dispute is conceptualized as a private law
dispute between citizens or domiciliaries of two interested states, any third
state's interests in resolution of the dispute are ignored. Thus, resolution of
disputes under the Hague Convention on a bilateral basis would defeat the ob-
jective of a globally-accepted tradeoff between trade and non-trade concerns.
The following section explains why the WTO can provide a framework for
addressing the weaknesses of the Hague Convention approach and for exploiting
the possibilities for more narrowly-tailored arrangements for balancing trade and
non-trade concerns.
III.
THE WTO ALTERNATIVE TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The weaknesses of the Hague approach offer a roadmap for an alternative
solution to the problem of discrimination against foreign country judgments in
trade law. That solution falls, arguably, under the auspices of the WTO. Even if
existing trade law is insufficient to give a WTO complainant a reasonable pros-
pect of success, this article will now argue it is reasonable to reformulate and
extend the substantive trade law of the WTO in order to achieve precisely the
kind of security of trade expectations WTO law is generally designed to protect.
This approach would draw on the WTO's recent innovations in lawmaking to
reach into areas of domestic policy-making previously reserved to national dis-
cretion, such as antimonopoly policy in the telecommunications sector. A new
WTO agreement could easily build on the technical work accomplished thus far
at the Hague Conference. The precise structure of the mixed, double convention
- with required bases of jurisdiction, enforceable in every participating state;
permitted bases of jurisdiction, enforceable at the discretion of participating
116. Compare Hartford Fire Insurance v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (rejecting comity),
with Restatement (Third) the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 403 (1987) (favoring
comity).
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states; and prohibited bases of jurisdiction - might be modeled on the Subsidies
Code, a regime the WTO already has experience implementing. Relying on the
subsidy model would invoke the conceptual apparatus of subsidy law, and there
is already WTO doctrine that states that inferior remedial opportunities for
trade-related rights can impair the competitive relationship secured through ne-
gotiated tariff reductions and, by parity of reasoning, negotiated non-tariff con-
cessions. Finally, incorporating the issue of recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments into WTO law would relate the trade effects of non-recogni-
tion to the negotiated trade relationship between participating WTO countries; it
would redefine a broad range of substantive law claims - such as environmental
claims or child labor practices that operate as implicit subsidies - as claims
affecting welfare measured along both trade and non-trade parameters and thus
subject to WTO discipline when litigated outside the safe harbor jurisdictional
rules incorporated into the WTO. Political interests operating at both national
and supranational levels would then have an incentive to influence WTO negoti-
ations in order to preserve jurisdictional practices that permit the vindication of
non-trade values. Those political interests would then rather join the WTO than
destroy it. This article will address each of these points in turn.
A. Remedial Systems and the WTO: Violation and Non Violation Claims
With time and experience, WTO law has developed into a complex, yet
relatively clear, body of doctrine. Thus, according to a member of the WTO
legal staff, it is now generally accepted by WTO member states that only dispute
settlement claims based on nullification or impairment of the benefits secured
during negotiating rounds may be brought under WTO law, despite language
suggesting that claims are also possible if "attainment of any objective" of a
WTO agreement "is being impeded."' 7 A prima facie case of nullification or
impairment of benefits may be established if a WTO rule is violated.' 18 Other-
wise, the complainant must show that its reasonable expectations of trade bene-
fits were undercut by an unanticipated act by the defendant. 19 When the rules
117. See Werner Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATS, J. Irr'L EcON. L.
295, 297, nn.5-6 (1999) [hereinafter Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice] (also noting that, in
theory, GATT Article XXIII also provides for claims based on "the existence of any other situation,"
although the language has never been invoked in GATT or WTO dispute settlement).
118. GATT practice appeared to treat violation of a GATT rule as a prima facie showing, and
arguably an "irrefutable presumption," of nullification or impairment of negotiated GATT benefits.
See id. at 298, n.8 (citing WTO Panel Report on US - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances ("Superfund"), adopted on June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. 34S/136, 158, para. 5.1.9).
One might question whether the presumption is truly "irrefutable" if at the remedial phase of a
proceeding the complainant must still prove that its retaliatory suspension of concessions, assuming
the defendant does not comply with a ruling requiring it to withdraw its offending measure, corre-
sponds to the value of the benefits that were nullified or impaired.
119. The non-violation theory supposes that competitive opportunities bargained for in the ne-
gotiating round are vitiated by an otherwise WTO legal measure, such as creation or expansion of a
free trade area or customs union. See, e.g., EEC - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37" Supp.)
at 86 (1991) (Report of the GATT Panel). In theory, as Zdouc observes, the GATT dispute settle-
ment system also has competence over "the existence of any other situation" that either nullifies or
impairs benefits or impedes the attainment of any objective of a covered agreement. Zdouc, WTO
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of the DSU are extended to dispute resolution for a WTO agreement, they apply
to interpretation and enforcement of that agreement.1 20 The violation and non-
violation theories thus might give rise to two distinct methods of bringing the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments into WTO law: first, through
judicial innovation; and second, through legislative innovation.
1 21
1. Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO/DSB
Judicial innovation could immediately introduce recognition of foreign
judgments into the WTO/DSU domain based on an analogy to existing WTO
precedent. The best available analogy for extending the law of the WTO to
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, namely the core nondiscrimi-
nation principles of national treatment principle and most-favored-nation treat-
ment, is U.S. - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.122 This pre-WTO panel
report concluded that the differences between U.S. procedures for the enforce-
ment of foreign and domestic patent rights operated as a violation of the national
treatment principle of GATT because section 337 provided domestic patent
holders more immediate and extensive remedies with respect to imported prod-
ucts than were available to similarly situated foreign patent holders before fed-
eral district courts. The panel rejected the U.S. argument that the federal district
court procedure's unfavorable elements and remedies were not discriminatory
because section 337 relief for domestic holders of patents could be reduced on
public policy grounds, restoring the balance of competitive opportunities.
123
One possible reading of the panel report, which the panel understood to be appli-
cable also to cases outside the realm of intellectual property, 124 is that any dif-
Dispute Settlement Practice, supra note 116, at n.6. But the absence of any evidence of claims
based on such theories suggests that these possible claims should, for purposes of analysis of the
recognition of foreign judgments, be subsumed under the non-violation, nullification or impairment
of benefits theory.
120. See WTO/DSU, art. 3.2, which provides:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security
and predictability in the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it
serves to preserve the rights and obligations of the Members under the covered agree-
ments and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and
rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements.
See Adrian T. L. Chua, Precedent and Principles of WTO Panel Jurisprudence, 16 BERK. J. INT'L L.
171, 175 (1998) (affirming incorporation of GATT acquis) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Chua,
Precedent and Principles].
121. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 333 (1999) [hereinafter Trachtman, Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution] (analyzing the process
of WTO lawmaking in the DSU and negotiating rounds through the two optics of incomplete con-
tracting and the rules/standards dichotomy and arguing against lawmaking through judicial gap-
filling of incompletely negotiated WTO agreements or judicial elaboration of standards in the ab-
sence of negotiated rules).
122. Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36' Supp.) at 345.
123. Id. at para. 5.14; see also Chua, Precedent and Principles, supra note 120, at 194 (describ-
ing this holding).
124. Nov. 7, 1989 GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at para. 5.5; see also Chua, Precedent and
Principles, supra note 120, at 180 (describing this dictum).
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ferences between judicial procedures and remedies for nationals and procedures
and remedies for foreigners, such as the invocability of a public policy excep-
tion, violate the national treatment principle. This reading would be consistent
with the WTO Appellate Body's emerging tendency to utilize common-law con-
cepts of holding and dicta to describe the reasoning of panel reports as prece-
dent.' 2 5 It could also be supported by the Appellate Body's treatment of panel
reports as subsequent practice, also capable of establishing the meaning of the
GATT law carried over by the DSU and now applicable in WTO dispute
settlement. '
26
Analyzing the trade impact of enforcement procedures may be equally ap-
plicable to the recognition of foreign judgments. Enforcing domestic judgments
without the exceptions that are available under either federal law or state com-
mon or statute law accords a preference to domestic judgments thereby discrimi-
nating against claims that are adjudicated in foreign jurisdictions.' 27 Claims
brought in a foreign jurisdiction may be adjudicated there because that country's
law provides a basis for jurisdiction that might be considered exorbitant in the
enforcing jurisdiction.1 2 8 Public policy grounds for non-enforcement of such
exorbitant foreign judgments are in effect objections to a foreign jurisdiction's
attempts to aid plaintiffs willing and able to exploit favorable foreign jurisdic-
tional law. Arguably these practices burden either the most favored nation or
national treatment principles by determining judicial enforcement rights on the
basis of the improper criterion of nationality.
It is argued, however, that the national treatment norm is not necessarily
violated when specific exorbitant grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction are
applied against non-nationals solely because of their non-domiciliary status.
1 29
The effect of the domicile criterion may be to discriminate on the basis of na-
tionality, but the fact that the measure permits, but does not require, nationality-
based discrimination may protect it against being labeled a national treatment
violation and thus prima facie a nullification or impairment of benefits. This is
so because it now appears settled that the mere potential for discriminatory treat-
ment is not sufficient to establish a violation.130 More important, the trade-
related features of the U.S. - Section 337 of the Tariff Act were plain on their
face because the procedural and remedial advantages afforded to U.S. patent
holders operated directly at the border and thus immediately affected the com-
petitive relationship between domestic producers and foreign importers of pat-
125. See Chua, Precedent and Principles, supra note 120, at 181-82 (relying on Canada -
Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, June 30, 1997, W/T/DS31/AB/R, where the Appellate
Body carefully distinguished prior panel reports and described some cited authority as obiter dicta,
and as evidence of the precedential effect of pre-WTO GATT jurisprudence).
126. See id. at 185 (quoting statement to this effect in Japan -Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
Appellate Body Report, Nov. 1, 1996, WTIDS8//AB/R, WTIDS10//AB/R, WT/DSI I/AB/R, at 17).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 67 - 91 (discussing origins and evolution of U.S. law).
128. See supra notes 27-28 (identifying the so-called exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction under
E.U. law).
129. See REIMANN, A GUIDE THmouH THE JUNGLE, supra note 99, at 71.
130. See Chua, Precedent and Principles, supra note 120, at 191-93, n.141 (citing U.S. - Taxes
on Petroleum and Certain Imported Products, supra note 116, para. 5.2.2).
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ented products otherwise protected by U.S. intellectual property law. The same
cannot be said for recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Nonetheless, the reasoning behind finding a violation of the national treat-
ment principle may support a non-violation claim. Refusal to enforce a foreign
judgment on public policy or other grounds may operate as a defensive trade
measure that nullifies or impairs negotiated benefits without violating a rule of
the WTO. In effect, then, undisciplined use of public policy or other exceptions
may lead to a progressive undermining of the negotiated balance of advantages.
This would occur because competitive opportunities created under WTO negoti-
ations would not be exploited fully by private actors when the security of their
trading interests would not be protected by judicial procedures and remedial
systems that adequately vindicate their substantive rights. The jurisprudence of
the GATT/WTO confirms that the actual effect on the competitive relationship
established in a negotiating round would need to be proven under a non-viola-
tion theory.1 31 More important, to make out a claim that the balance of advan-
tages secured through the negotiated reciprocal tariff reductions was nullified or
impaired, one would need to show that the nonrecognition and enforcement of a
foreign judgment actually undercut a reasonable expectation of judgment en-
forcement that was actually part of the bargained-for exchange of trade conces-
sions in a prior negotiating round.1 32 It would be hard to show this for
discriminatory non-enforcement of foreign judgments, a practice so settled in
the fabric of international economic law as to defy any suggestion that world
trade law has ever disciplined ordinary domestic rules relating to international
judicial cooperation.
Moreover, it might be imprudent to extend the GATT acquis to the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments solely on the basis of a creative reading of
GAT' precedent. The concept of precedent is strictly speaking applicable only
to judge-made law and is in tension with Article 3.2 of the DSU's command that
dispute settlement systems must not affect the rights and duties of parties to the
covered WTO agreements.
133
2. Legislative Innovation at the WTO
New WTO legislation could draw on the evolving approach to the scope of
activities subject to WTO disciplines evidenced in the new telecommunications
regime. The so-called Reference Paper' 34 incorporates competition law princi-
131. See Panel Report on Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulfate, adopted on April 3, 1950,
GATT B.I.S.D. 11/188, para. 12; Panel Report on EEC - Oilseeds, GATT B.I.S.D. 39S/91, 114-115,
para. 77; Japan - Film, WT/DS44/R, at 391, para. 10.72 and 394, para. 10.82; see also Zdouc, WTO
Dispute Settlement Practice, supra note 117, at 307 (summarizing WTO/GATT doctrine).
132. See EEC - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds, supra
note 117, at 128-29; see generally Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice, supra note 117, at 306
(analyzing WTO doctrine).
133. See WTO/DSU, art. 3.2, supra note 120.
134. Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles of the Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommu-
nications, Apr. 24, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 354, 367 [hereinafter the Reference Paper].
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pies into the law of the WT0 1 35 and thus makes national regulatory policy on
domestic market structure a potential matter of trade concern. WTO/DSB prece-
dent suggests, however, that the extension of competition principles throughout
the body of substantive WTO law would require more than reasoned elaboration
of the national treatment principle as it relates to non-violation claims.136 Ad-
mittedly, then, the Reference Paper only operates in a specific area of WTO law:
trade in basic telecommunications services. 137  Moreover, it is not a WTO
agreement in its own right. Rather, it is included in WTO law only when each
Member specifically includes it in its offer for basic telecommunications ser-
vices during the negotiating round.1 3 8 Nonetheless, this legislative precedent
suggests that domestic regulatory policy can be made a subject of bargaining, so
that compliance with specific regulatory principles that have trade implications
could be bargained for as a trade benefit in a WTO negotiating round.
The precise structure of the Reference Paper does not, however, supply a
model for drafting an illustrative agreement on the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. The Reference Paper is based on policy science underly-
ing competition law. It reflects a particular solution to a particular problem: the
transformation of monopolized telecommunications industries in developing
countries into free market-oriented entities. By contrast, the draft Hague Agree-
ment suggests that it will be necessary to divide the exercise of judicial jurisdic-
tion into categories that reflect the diversity of practices and domestic
requirements of the world's various legal systems. For example, it would need
to address the U.S.'s anomalous constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction'
3 9
and its unsettled law with respect to the outer perimeters of federal non-legisla-
135. See Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice, supra note 117, at 305-06 (stating that the
Reference Paper holds governments "responsible for anti -competitive conduct by 'essential facili-
ties' for, or 'major suppliers' of, telecommunications services even if actions of such entities have
only a remote link to the government").
136. See Panel Report on Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
DS/44, Jan. 30, 1998, adopted March 31, 1998 (rejecting non-violation claim by U.S. asserting that
Japanese producer, Fuji Film, through a system of restrictive distribution arrangements, and with the
acquiescence of the Japanese government through its failure to enforce Japanese competition law,
foreclosed the U.S. importer, Kodak, from the Japanese market, thus effectively undercutting the
competitive relationship the U.S. had obtained through bargained-for tariff reductions).
137. See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IB, LEGAL TEXTS - RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 44 [hereinafter the "GATS"]; Fourth Protocol to the GATS, Apr. 15, 1997,
36 I.L.M. 154 [hereinafter Fourth Protocol].
138. Laura B. Sherman, "Wildly Enthusiastic" About the First Multilateral Agreement on
Trade in Telecommunications Services, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 61, 87 (1998).
139. See generally Brand, Due Process, supra note 88; see also Russell J. Weintraub, Negotiat-
ing the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judgments Convention, 61 ALB. L. REv. 1269 (1998) [here-
inafter Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort] (arguing that, although treaty makers do not have
constitutional authority to extend U.S. jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits, treaty makers do
have constitutional authority to require federal and state courts to forgo the exercise of particular
bases of jurisdiction, including the most problematic forms of jurisdiction - general, "doing busi-
ness" and "transient," or so-called tag, jurisdiction).
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tive preemption of a state's exercise of jurisdiction.140 A model subtler than the
Reference Paper is necessary to address these incompatibilities.
B. The Subsidies Code Model: Substantive and Procedural Dimensions
In contrast to the Reference Paper, which does not accommodate the diver-
sity of practices among the world's legal systems, the WTO Subsidies Code
14 '
provides a model that accounts for these differences. It factors national regula-
tory policies into a baseline, a so-called level playing field, from which compar-
ative advantages of nations are measured. 142
A recent complaint before the WTO/DSB demonstrates that the subsidy
concept can be extended to problems that amount to an asymmetrical exercise of
jurisdiction. In United States - Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corpora-
tions,143 the EC challenged the United States' creation of certain exemptions.
The U.S. claimed that the exemptions were needed to compensate U.S. exporters
for the trade disadvantages they faced because the U.S. employs a world-wide
system of taxation and competing nations employ a territorial taxation sys-
tem. 144 Asserting principles of "tax sovereignty," the U.S. went on to argue that
"the WTO should not penalize a country using a world-wide system for incorpo-
rating elements of a territorial system," such as the exemptions for Foreign Sale
Corporations, "in order to obtain comparable tax treatment for its exporters."'
' 45
The Panel rejected the U.S. arguments. The Panel Report asserted that,
while the U.S. was free to maintain any type of tax system it wanted, the Subsi-
dies Code mandated that a nation cannot "establish a regime of direct taxation,
provide an exemption from direct taxes specifically related to exports, and then
claim that it is entitled to provide such an export subsidy because it is necessary
to eliminate a disadvantage to exporters created by the US tax system itself."'
' 4 6
In sum, the Panel Report acknowledged the tax, or jurisdictional, sovereignty of
the United States, but nonetheless compelled the U.S. to pay for exercising this
140. See Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity," 83 IOWA L. REv. 893, 947-49
(raising the question whether the non-extraterritoriality and non-violation of international law inter-
pretive canons apply in the absence of federal legislation to compel state courts to exercise restraint
in exercising jurisdiction in foreign commerce cases). See also Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (2000).
141. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex I A, THE LEGAL TEXTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,
33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter the "Subsidies Code"].
142. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsTZm, supra note 42, at 237 (noting that at one
point the Brazilians argued that their comparative advantage in trade was Brazil's capacity to absorb
a greater amount of pollution than other countries).
143. WT/DS108/R, Oct. 8, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 173.
144. The Panel Report noted: "The United States argues that world-wide systems of taxation,
such as that of the United States, place exporters at a disadvantage relative to exporters from coun-
tries with territorial tax systems, because, under a territorial system, whenever activities relating to
an export transaction occur outside the territory of the taxing jurisdiction, income form such activi-
ties is not taxed." Id. at para 7.121, 38 I.L.M. at 205.
145. Id.
146. id. at para. 7.122, 38 I.L.M. at 205.
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right by not allowing it to bend WTO rules in order to compensate for the fact
that the U.S. taxation system burdens U.S. exporters with trade disadvantages.
This reading of the Panel Report analysis of tax jurisdiction suggests that
the Subsidies Code itself provides a workable model for a trade-related regime
for global standards on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. The Subsidies Code
distinguishes between three types of subsidies: (1) expressly permitted or "non-
actionable" subsidies (so-called "green light" measures), (2) expressly prohib-
ited subsidies (so-called "red light" measures), and (3) an intermediate class of
"actionable" subsidies (so-called "yellow light" measures) that may be permitted
or prohibited depending on their effects on trade. 14 7 The Hague Conference
proposal favored by the U.S. would make precisely this kind of distinction
among bases of jurisdiction. It distinguishes among judgments that are: (1)
expressly permitted and enforceable on the basis of jurisdiction, (2) permitted
but not necessarily enforceable on the basis of jurisdiction, and (3) prohibited
and thereby necessarily unenforceable on the basis of jurisdiction.
Thus, one could draw on the insights of United States - Tax Treatment for
Foreign Sales Corporations to translate The Hague Conference proposal into a
WTO agreement enforceable at the WTO/DSB. Judgments based on expressly
permitted jurisdictional grounds would not violate trade law, while judgments
based on prohibited grounds of jurisdiction would operate as violations of trade
law and establish prima facie cases of nullification or impairment of benefits.
By contrast, the exercise of jurisdiction to render a judgment on a basis that is
neither expressly permitted nor expressly prohibited may or may not confer a
trade advantage to the state authorizing that exercise of jurisdiction.
Whether or not a trade advantage is conferred may not even be clear in a
particular case. States will therefore need to conduct overall assessments of the
trade effects of the regular exercise of each basis for jurisdiction. If, for exam-
ple, U.S. "doing business" jurisdiction were neither permitted nor prohibited,
one might still imagine that even the threat of U.S. courts exercising "doing
business" jurisdiction would require foreign firms to structure their activities so
as to avoid the risk of U.S. litigation. This could in theory impose considerable
costs on foreign firms. Yet, a state that wanted to claim that its trade rights had
been violated would have to produce evidence of judicial practice and the actual
use of the questionable bases of jurisdiction. Therefore, it would be imperative
that the U.S. and other nations avoid conclusory reasoning about the discrimina-
tory character of their trading partners' practices in recognizing and enforcing
foreign judgments.' 48 If the U.S. is not prepared to harmonize its jurisdictional
practices with those of the rest of the world, then it must at least wish to demon-
strate that its practices are not yielding adverse trade effects for its trading part-
ners in the WTO. Ultimately, however, the U.S. might agree to trade off the
right to exercise "doing business" jurisdiction, if it is so internationally offensive
that persuading other nations to accept it could only be done at a prohibitively
147. See generally id. at 290-93.
148. See Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, supra note 66, at 115-16; Weintraub, How
Substantial is Our Need, supra note 66, at 170-71.
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high cost in trade concessions. 149 This might happen either at the front end in
the form of bargaining trade opportunities for rights to preserve national juris-
dictional autonomy or at the back end of litigating claims that arise from the
trade effects of those practices.
Moreover, domestic understanding of the questionable character of U.S.
jurisdictional and other litigation practices will be enriched by the domestic po-
litical debate about the relevant policy tradeoffs, and this enriched debate may
well minimize the deadening effect of xenophobia on political discourse. As the
next section will argue, reducing this xenophobia is ultimately at the heart of the
argument for moving the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
from the Hague Conference to the WTO.
C. Jurisdictional Law as the Mediator for Trade and Non-Trade Values
A Subsidies Code model for incorporating recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments into the law of the WTO has two advantages: (1) it draws on
the policy and precedent of WTO law and (2) it focuses attention on developing
a calculus for balancing trade and non-trade values. These advantages lead to a
third important advantage. Bargaining over specific tradeoffs will strengthen
public interest in the WTO decision-making process and thereby increase the
legitimacy of outcomes negotiated and enforced under the auspices of the WTO.
For example, those who believe that child labor unfairly subsidizes domes-
tic production may be prepared to urge their national representatives and lobby
foreign governments to expend scarce negotiating capital to secure either (1)
substantive trade rules declaring such practices to be subsidies or (2) jurisdic-
tional rules that facilitate domestic judgments against foreign producers engag-
ing in such practices. These judgments would be enforceable under WTO law.
Failure to respect this type of foreign judgment produced in accordance with
agreed upon WTO rules would in turn authorize retaliatory suspension of trade
concessions.
The preceding example serves to illustrate how trade and non-trade values
can be mediated in the WTO. 1 5 0 In effect, one would monetize - in the cur-
149. Cf Weintraub, Negotiating the Tort, supra note 139, at 1281 ("Whether or not the judg-
ments project [at the Hague] reaches a successful conclusion, the process of negotiation will make
clear to us in what ways our methods of adjudication are disapproved abroad. Such knowledge can
have a salutary effect of causing us to revise some of the least attractive aspects of our administra-
tion of justice.").
150. Another possible example may well be the line of U.S. cases, beginning with Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), which has culminated in the assertion of tag jurisdiction in
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), where an Alien Tort Claims Act suit was initiated
against a visiting head of government of an unrecognized state for conduct allegedly constituting
human rights and humanitarian law violations under international law and occurring on territory and
affecting persons unconnected to the forum. This context does not appear to generate a claim of
nullification and impairment of trade benefits. Rather than carve out of the WTO these kinds of
potentially exorbitant attempts to exercise judicial and legislative jurisdiction, it would seem to be
preferable to rely on the requirement that nullification and impairment of benefits be shown to deny
a WTO plaintiff a right to a WTO remedy. Thus, there should be no danger that pure human rights
cases, having no trade effects, would be chilled by the failure to include a human rights exception in
a WTO agreement on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
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rency of tariffs and related concessions - the obligation to enforce judgments
relating to conduct that may produce trade effects. The negotiating process
would help define the scope of activities that produce trade effects in terms of
the type of jurisdiction states are free to assert over the production or consump-
tion effects of the imported products or services covered by the WTO. While
some argue plausibly that (1) an exporting state's domestic policies with only
domestic effects are not of international concern because they do not prevent
global welfare maximization 15  and that (2) treating production processes as
trade issues could unravel the international trade system by providing loopholes
for disguised protectionism,1 52 these questions should not be answered a priori.
Rather, they should be determined within the international political process.
153
IV.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: A Civic REPUBLICAN VISION
Addressing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments explic-
itly as a trade issue through a WTO agreement has two benefits. The first bene-
fit relates to the political legitimacy of the WTO. The other concerns the quality
of WTO decision-making. The legitimization argument turns on the premise
that, as much as increased transparency of its legislative and adjudicatory func-
tions will increase the procedural legitimacy of WTO decision-making, the
WTO also needs to increase its substantive legitimacy. This means that interest
By contrast, civil judgments relating to human rights violations might naturally be included in
the scope of a Hague Judgments Convention. See John F. Murphy, Civil Liability of the Commission
of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. L.J. 1, 56
(1999) (suggesting the issue be on the Conference's agenda). However, since a Hague Conference
Convention would operate without the benefit of the additional requirement of a showing of nullifi-
cation or impairment of trade benefits, the precise scope of coverage of such judgments would need
to be defined. This difficult issue could well be a deal breaker in that context.
151. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the Euro-
pean Community and the International Community, 83 VA. L. REV. 1331, 1335 (1997) ("[ln the
case of process standards not coupled with trade restrictions, there is no divergence between the in-
state calculus and the global social calculus.").
152. See JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 42, at 237 ("Whether an import-
ing nation could use border restrictions or taxes to equalize the price of imported goods with domes-
tic costs of health and safety regulation is as yet an unresolved issue for the world trading system. It
is an issue fraught with dangerous potential. If this principle were extended to many types of gov-
emnment regulation - for example, minimum wage or other labor regulations - it could be the basis
of a rash of import restrictions, often defeating the basic goals of comparative advantage. Govern-
ment regulations vary so greatly that the already difficult conceptual questions of the world's rules
on subsidies would pale in significance beside the problems that the costs of regulation equalization
would create").
153. See infra text accompanying notes 168-95 (relating the substance of WTO law and institu-
tions to a republican conception of international political process); see also Steve Charnowitz, World
Trade and the Environment: A Review of the New WTO Report, 12 GEO. ITrr'L ENVTL. L. REv. 523,
535 (2000) (criticizing the WTO Secretariat Report of Oct. 14, 1999 as failing to provide an inte-
grated analytical structure that would recognize that "environmental and economic phenomena are
two lenses for looking at the same phenomena"). Chamowitz calls for greater WTO attention to the
enforcement aspects of the environmental dimension to welfare maximization, and he notes that
vague WTO references to "structured cooperation" will not do. Id. at 534. In that spirit, the central
thesis of this article is that making the domestic effects of the production process a matter of intema-
tional enforcement cannot be separated from the stimulation of an international political process, that
is, the WTO bargaining process.
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groups need more than a voice in WTO decision-making. They need their inter-
ests tolerably satisfied. Judgments enforcement, if it effectively vindicates inter-
ests arising from the failure of import prices to reflect the true social costs of
production and consumption, will provide WTO opponents with a reason to ex-
ercise whatever voice increased transparency gives them. Opponents of the cur-
rent trade regime will then begin to see the WTO as an appropriate institutional
vehicle through which to address their concerns.
Moreover, to the extent that effective policy-making supports political le-
gitimacy, treating judgments recognition and enforcement as a WTO bargaining
subject may also improve the quality of WTO lawmaking and adjudication.
Transforming trade agendas at WTO negotiations into more inclusive discus-
sions of trade and non-trade values should broaden the database for policy-mak-
ing, thereby yielding a better balance of competing values. As the recent
disruption at the WTO Millennium Round opening makes clear, 15 4 both an in-
creased commitment to the WTO process from potential stakeholders and an
increased sensitivity to non-trade concerns among trade negotiators are needed if
the WTO is to succeed in the next negotiating round. Attempting to conceal
value differences between nations and transnational groups by asking courts to
continue to take primary responsibility for resolving value conflicts in specific
cases is neither politically sustainable nor just.'
55
These benefits may not come without a cost, however. One consequence of
including non-trade interests in WTO decision-making may be that the mode of
expressing those interests is transformed. Outside of the WTO, non-trade inter-
ests employ a populist, grass-roots political style that draws on the moral sense
of the community. The ethical demands that occur when citizens of first-world
states encounter labor conditions in the developing world and the intergenera-
tional ethical demands arising from abuse of the current world ecosystem make
trade a matter of moral relevance. This lays the groundwork for a political style
that Max Weber usefully described as an "ethic of ultimate ends."' 56 This pas-
sionate style of politics confronts the established order and demands its recon-
struction. It is not a style well suited to the kind of marginal decision-making
that characterizes choice within an institution like the WTO. The Seattle pro-
tests in November 1999 proved that grassroots politics is a potent source of
154. See After Seattle: A Global Disaster, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, at 19 (attributing
the collapse of talks as much to U.S. arrogance and the inflexibility of E.U. negotiators as to the
effect on these negotiators of the protests against WTO policies alleged to be insensitive to non-trade
concerns).
155. See Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviewing the Public Law Taboo in International Conflict of
Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 283-86 (1999) (arguing against judicial invocation of conflict of
laws tools, such as comity, to address transnational public law disputes on grounds of courts' lack of
democratic legitimacy, their institutional incompetence in achieving predictability, and the likely
practical effect of preventing or discouraging explicit public regulation of important social problems
through legislative action or international negotiation); cf Russell J. Weintaub, The Extraterritorial
Application of Antitrust and Securities Law: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law" Ap-
proach, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1799, 1817 (1992) (comity undercuts the capacity of political branches to
negotiate agreements with foreign countries).
156. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 120
(Gerth & Mills eds., 1976).
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political creativity that is needed to overcome institutional resistance to change.
The rationalization of non-trade politics therefore produces a potential downturn
in political creativity.
Describing incorporation of non-trade values into the WTO law as "ration-
alization" may, however, conceal a potential advantage of making a place for
their proponents at the WTO. The term "domestication" is perhaps more re-
vealing even though it is overused in the literature of international law. In fact,
it may unfortunately suggest that populist politics of this kind would be caged in
a Weberian historical inevitability of bureaucratization, which in turn risks en-
couraging the mass, faceless politics of the corporatist states of the first half of
the 2 0
t
h century.' 57 Moreover, "domestication" might suggest more of a domes-
tic analogy than is warranted by the current development of international civil
society. Nonetheless, "domestication," unlike "rationalization," suggests an im-
portant and, if one believes that pluralist politics is morally and pragmatically
desirable, beneficial consequence of incorporating non-trade concerns into WTO
law: the possibility that interest group politics will begin to overshadow subver-
sive expression.
Nonetheless, even if non-trade values require some institutional recogni-
tion, some argue instead for the establishment of a separate non-trade organiza-
tion to develop global standards for labor and the environment.' 58 However, in
the absence of an organization or organizations that could make non-trade pol-
icy, and thereby either merit some deference by the WTO 1 5 9 or impose some
binding sanctions itself,' 60 the WTO is the only player in town. Indeed, without
WTO involvement, the international private sector cannot by itself insist that
environmental and labor values be extended to reflect rationally the balance of
needs and interests of all interested parties, rather than merely the precise corre-
lation of power between business groups and host states.' 6 1 Perhaps a strategy
that locates trade and non-trade value protection in separate international institu-
tions rests principally on the fear that protecting labor and environmental con-
cerns through the mechanism of the WTO's dispute resolution system would
allow countries to evade genuine trade commitments in order to increase protec-
tionism under the pretext of non-trade values.1 62 Yet this argument betrays a
157. See RALF DAHRENDORF, SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY 42 (1967) (in his now
classic analysis of the origins of German Fascism, critiquing as unsound the then received capitalist-
origins explanation, which, Dahrendorf argued, one "may trace back to Max Weber whose concept
of capitalism with its preconditions in economic attitudes and consequences of bureaucratic organi-
zation displays traces of an historical necessity A la Hegel").
158. See Why Greens Should Love Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, at 17-18 (editorial
suggesting there is a case for a global environmental agreement separate from the WTO).
159. See Perez, WTO and U.N. Law, supra note 3 1, at 377 (noting absence of such a regime in
the environmental area).
160. See, e.g., Dan C. Esty, Stepping Up to the Global Environmental Challenge, 8 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 103, 111 (1996).
161. But see Jennifer L. Johnson, Public-Private Convergence: How the Public Actor Can
Shape Public International Labor Standards, 24 BROOK. J. Irr'L L. 291 (1998) (arguing for private,
rather than public, sector management of norm evolution in this area).
162. See Clueless in Seattle, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 17 (arguing that the Clinton
Administration in arguing that labor and environmental concerns should be part of the Millennium
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fear that a politically-accountable process at the WTO would yield outcomes
different from those that global elites might prefer.'
63
We need not reach the merits here of whether increased protection of non-
trade interests threatens to undermine the protection of legitimate trade interests
at the WTO, because genuine concerns about the legitimacy of the WTO politi-
cal process need to be satisfied first.' 64 Creating real channels of representation
for communities and interest groups is critical to sustaining the WTO's legiti-
macy. Indeed some argue that even transnational organizations risk discon-
necting the representation of non-trade interests from its democratic roots and
domestic electoral accountability when they focus their political activities on
getting non-trade interests a voice in the WTO. 165 This critique draws on public
choice theory's prediction that transnational private groups, whether they be cor-
porations or non-commercial associations, organize and thereby achieve politi-
cal results that might not otherwise flow from more broadly inclusive political
processes disciplined by accountability to constituents.
166
Increased transparency and accountability in WTO decision-making would,
of course, mitigate the force of the public choice critique, particularly in WTO
adjudication. 1 67  However, the inevitable secretiveness of WTO lawmaking
Round negotiating agenda has conceded the erroneous premise of the protesters that free trade may
not be welfare enhancing); see also Who Needs the WTO?, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 74
(arguing that a WTO that allowed its dispute settlement system to be employed to further labor and
environmental concerns would reduce free trade and undercut growth in the developing countries by
authorizing retaliation by developed countries in the form of additional trade restrictions against
developing country exports). See also Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism, supra note 41; JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 42, at 237.
163. See Perez, Who Killed Sovereignty?, supra note 56 (criticizing argument that international
governance calls for reliance on the work of technocratic elites as its primary mode of
legitimization).
164. See Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 658, 660 (1996) (argu-
ing that the WTO as currently constituted is incapable of addressing non-trade values, thus under-
mining the support of member states; Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
Organization Disputes to Non-Government Parties, 17 U. PA. Irr'L ECON. L. 295 (1996); G. Rich-
ard Snell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade
Organization, 17 U. PA. INT'L ECON. L. 359 (1996).
165. See Citizens' Groups: The Non-Governmental Order, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999, at
21 (asking: "Are citizens' groups, as their many supporters claim, the first steps toward an 'interna-
tional civil society, (whatever that might be)? Or do they represent a dangerous shift of power to
unelected and unaccountable special interest groups?"); see generally, Spiro, New Global Potentates,
supra note 54.
166. Embedded in public choice analysis are the assumptions that the distortions produced by
public lawmaking would be greater than those of private lawmaking; or, equivalently, that the harms
identified by the public choice critique would be outweighed by the benefits - that otherwise would
not be achieved in a given institution - the so-called "public goods" critique. See Paul Stephan,
Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law: Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public
Choice Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745, 750 (1995)
[hereinafter Stephan, Barbarians].
167. See generally Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of
Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1021 (1999) (arguing
for a revised standard of review in WTO environmental cases, which would "require national gov-
ernments to balance the competing trade and environmental interests by means of transparent rules
and procedures. In order to satisfy the requirement of transparency, governments must ensure that
the decision making procedures that produce environmental trade measures afford a meaningful
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would limit the degree to which increased transparency in WTO adjudication
could remedy the biases of WTO lawmaking.
16 8
Yet, a second-best theory offers a possible rebuttal to the welfare-reduction
aspect of the public choice critique. An emerging literature that catalogues the
underproduction of "global" public goods' 69 suggests it may be warranted to
tolerate the disproportionate influence of groups that stimulate the production of
such goods. In other words, the political process failure of non-transparent and
unaccountable groups stimulating the "overproduction" of measures protecting
non-trade values at the WTO could in theory rectify a public goods failure in the
"underproduction" of environment and labor protecting measures.170 This ques-
tion must ultimately be answered by a self-correcting political process, one that
in extraordinary moments is capable of making informed judgments about
whether and how to correct for ordinary politics' failure to achieve a global
balance in the production of private and public goods.
In practice, then, the case for incorporation of non-trade values into the
WTO dispute settlement system presupposes that WTO political and legal pol-
icy-making procedures accommodate global trade and non-trade interests effec-
tively. This may be a questionable assumption, for no one can claim that the
transnational political process - whether it be at the United Nations or the WTO
- currently represents a world community of the kind that one usually associates
with the modem nation-state. That said, one readily observes that many nation-
states are characterized by a fragmented national political community and iden-
tity. They are separated into multiple demoi and identities, both in cases of
dissolution of previously fictive national communities such as the former Yugo-
slavia 171 and in emerging consolidated supranational communities such as the
European Union. 172 But global politics should not be based on the level of
legitimacy experienced in former Yugoslavia. Neither would one want to em-
opportunity for foreign interests to present their views, receive a reasoned response, and to obtain
review in a neutral tribunal").
168. See generally Stephan, Barbarians, supra note 166.
169. See generally GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21- CEN-
TURY (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grundberg & Marc Stern eds., 1999).
170. There are, of course, examples of non-transparent, unaccountable processes which, al-
though in large part produced private gains, at the same time unavoidably produced a public good
that otherwise would be under-produced. See, e.g., J. Lawrence Broz, Origins of the Federal Re-
serve System: International Incentives and the Domestic Free-Rider Problem, 53 INr'L ORG. 39
(Winter 1999) (arguing that the establishment of the Federal Reserve system as a public good, creat-
ing, among other things, a stable domestic currency, was made possible by the private benefits the
system gave to money-center banks). Assuming that the private good and public good are true joint
goods - that is, they cannot be produced separately - then the ancillary production of a private good
may be a necessary evil in the optimal production of the public good. On this reasoning, gains
achieved by environmental or labor activists may be necessary evils in the production of globally
efficient levels of non-trade, public goods.
171. See generally SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AF-
TrER THE COLD WAR (1995) (outlining the Bosnian crisis that developed in the multicultural states of
the former Yugoslavia).
172. See generally J.H.H. WELER, ESSAYS ON EUROPE (1995); compare MICHAEL WALZER,
THICK AND THIN MORAL ARGUMENTS AT HOME AND ABROAD (1994) (meditating on the tension
between a deeply-rooted or "thick" identity politics and a "thin" politics of common association in
civil society based on more superficial compatibilities between otherwise distinct groups).
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ploy the degree of coercion necessary to compel global compliance with norms
that industrialized democracies would accept. As James Madison once argued,
this would be "worse than the disease."
1 73
We may therefore be left with the chicken-and-egg problem that good sub-
stantive rules presuppose good politics, which in turn presuppose good constitu-
tional rules, which in turn presuppose good constitutional politics, which in turn
presuppose the prospect of good substantive rules. This seems to be a very
bleak picture, at least for now. However, one cannot assume that the quasi-
market solution of choosing between trade and non-trade policies, either through
competition between the WTO and a similar non-trade organization or through
competition between trade and non-trade values, will always be superior to alter-
native institutional approaches.' 74 A better comparative institutional analysis
would account for the possibility that the transnational political process will
transform into a process that more effectively disciplines parties that abuse
WTO law and its dispute settlement system. This analysis would focus both on
avoiding the exploitation of non-trade exceptions for protectionist purposes as
well as accounting for the genuinely welfare-reducing effects of global free
trade policies. It is impossible to determine a priori whether the WTO requires
radical reformation before it can effectively address non-trade concerns, or
whether it is timely to co-opt non-trade political groups when the transnational
political process is only just beginning to address non-trade issues. It should be
enough to dismiss as analytically incomplete any argument for excluding non-
trade concerns from the Millennium Round negotiations that is based on a static
conception of global governance. Governments may well break law in order
to stimulate the creation of new and better law,' 75 thus publicizing an issue
that is incompletely addressed by black letter law. 1 7 6 Moreover, transnational
networks of interest groups operating at the international institutional
level may well produce the "social capital" necessary for the formation of a
global civil society' 7 7 that, by supplementing the activity of states, could help
173. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison ) ("There are again two methods of removing the
causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty essential to its existence; the other, by giving to
every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests ....").
174. See generally NElL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 14 (arguing that
only comparative institutional analysis, that is analysis of costs of each institutional option, can
provide an adequate basis for choosing an institutional alternative to achieve policy goals, because a
costly institutional choice may yet be better than its even more costly alternatives).
175. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 312 (1997) (describing Tuna-Dolphin
Ban as "creative unilateralism," notwithstanding 1993 GATT Panel Report deciding that the U.S.
violated the national treatment rule and could not defend its extraterritorial attempt to protect dol-
phins under the GATT environmental and conservation exceptions).
176. See Trachtman, Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 121, at 346-50 (develop-
ing incomplete contracting analysis of WTO dispute resolution).
177. Cf. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Govern-
ance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 285 (1997) (citing and analogizing to Robert Putnam's work about
the role of civic organizations in creating the social capital necessary for robust democracy at the
national level).
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produce rules that are closer to the gravitational center of the global political
process. 1
78
In sum, when national and global politics work together with each ulti-
mately representing the interests and values of individuals and communities,
they constitute an evolving political system. As this system evolves, so must its
concept of law. A theory of global law mapping this dynamic dimension would
be, as James Madison put it, a "republican remedy for the disease most incident
to a republican government."' 179 Needless to say, the necessary global civic re-
publican theory has not yet been fashioned,' 80 but it is clear that civic republi-
canism's potential for addressing non-market values has already caught the
attention of domestic theorists.1 8' Indeed, only a republican theory accounting
for transnational interest group politics could also account for the probable supe-
riority of "legal," as opposed to international relations theory, approaches to
globalization at a time when the state will remain the most important actor in
global politics.1 82 In other words, only republicanism respects both the center
and the periphery. More importantly, only civic republicanism respects both
cosmopolitan and nationalist loyalties, for the problem of dual or multiple loyal-
ties will surely become a central fixture in virtually all trade-related issue areas,
perhaps even the most sensitive national security areas,' 83 of the emerging
structure of global governance.
This article's proposal for an agreement on the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments that works as a baseline for the negotiation of tariff bindings
is demonstrably superior to the private law approach of the Hague Conference
on Private International Law. It takes into account the dynamic dimensions of
the relationship between substantive WTO law and the domestic and global po-
litical processes that increasingly form the dual criteria for national negotiating
positions. It recognizes the need for states to build domestic political support for
the WTO through judiciaries capable of giving effect to private rights beyond
178. See generally COMMISSION, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD, supra note 61, at 25-62 (1995)
(report of elite group of global notables, inter alia, discussing the role of private and non-governmen-
tal organizations in the emerging global political process).
179. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
180. See generally NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, THE REPUBLICAN LEGACY IN INTERNATIONAL
THOGTrr (1998) (describing the loss and emerging rediscovery of civic republican conceptions of
global community as the foundation for international law); but see John 0. McGinnis, The Decline
of the Western Nation State and the Rise of the Regime of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L.
REV. 903, 918-19 (1996) (analogizing post-Cold War Bretton Woods institutions to 19' century U.S.
free trade federalism, offering a conception of global governance as a regime of very limited
government).
181. See generally Jane B. Baron and Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral
Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431 (1996) (noting the "un-
likely convergence" of anti-market perspectives in "such diverse contexts as environmental ethics,
civic republicanism, and commodification theory").
182. See Peter J. Spiro, Globalizations, International Law, and the Academy, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 567, 586-87 (2000).
183. See generally Linda Mabry, Multinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Re-
thinking the Concept of Corporate Nationality, 87 GEO. L. J. 563 (1999) (discussing the U.S. legisla-
tive response to the tension between national security and other interests in the production and
control of highly sensitive U.S.-origin technology and the increasingly transnational identities and
perspectives of multinational U.S. firms producing such technology).
[Vol. 19:44
2001] INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS 89
mere parchment declarations. Most important, it recognizes that in building a
global city-state, the civitas maxima of classical republican political theory, this
political dimension must be coupled with the additional legal requirement that,
under the imperative of avoiding globally-enforceable trade sanctions, the reme-
dies of domestic legal systems must be enforceable everywhere the global politi-
cal community extends.
